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INTRODUCTION
In November 2012, Harvard historian and conservative commentator
Niall Ferguson announced that the oil and gas production technique known
as hydraulic fracturing-or, more colloquially, as "fracking"-will usher in
"a new economic 'golden age' for the United States.' The "'good times
that lie ahead,"' according to Professor Ferguson, include surging energy
sector jobs, a "renaissance in manufacturing," and a strong dollar.' Around
the same time, Focus Features released Promised Land, a feature film star-
ring Matt Damon and John Krasinski, directed by Gus Van Sant, and co-
written by Dave Eggers.3 Promised Land tells the story of one small, rural
community's response to a large, out-of-state energy company's attempt to
frack the oil and gas beneath their farms and town. These media moments
are emblematic of the debate that has dominated so much of the national
discourse on fracking. On the one hand, you have the revitalization of
American empire;4 on the other hand, you have the deterioration of Ameri-
can values.' Who, then, should one believe? The venerable Niall Ferguson?
Or Matt Damon and his crew?
1. Andrew Stevens, U.S. Set for Fracking Bonanza, Says Historian Ferguson,
CNN.cOM (Nov. 23, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/l1/23/business/america-shale-gas-
ferguson-stevens/index.html. But see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2013 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at 2 (2013), available at
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/O383(2013).pdf ("Tight oil development is still at an
early stage, and the outlook is highly uncertain.").
2. Stevens, supra note 1.
3. PROMISED LAND (Focus Features 2012).
4. For a summary of shale gas's role in our national energy policy, see Energy in
Brief, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in-brief/about-shalegas.cfm
(last updated Dec. 5, 2012).
5. See, e.g., Richard Manning, Bakken Business: The Price of North Dakota's
Fracking Boom, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 2013, at 29; Edwin Dobb, The New Oil Landscape,
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG., Mar. 2013, at 28; see also Nancy D. Perkins, The Fracturing of
Place: The Regulation of Marcellus Shale Development and the Subordination of Local
Experience, 23 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 44, 47 (2012) ("As thousands of well pads trans-
form hundreds of thousands of acres of Pennsylvania's land in the coming years, shale will
be cracked open deep below the earth, local vistas will be scarred, waterways will be
stressed, and the peace and quiet of the Commonwealth's communities will be shattered by
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Fracking is all the rage.6 There are approximately thirty-one states
where industry has shown an interest in fracking or that otherwise have sig-
nificant shale gas reserves.7 Fracking operations in multiple states frequent-
ly draw simultaneously from cross-boundary "plays," such as the Marcellus,
Bakken, Antrim, New Albany, and Niobrara formations.' The industry has
had an extraordinary impact on local, state, and national economies.9 But it
has also been dogged by controversy, most of which is attributable to sever-
al interrelated factors: the undisclosed chemical contents of so-called
"fracking fluids," mixtures injected down drilled wells into the earth to
stimulate or enhance well production; the uncertain risks of groundwater
contamination and the fear and dread that risk inspires;" ° the inadequate
regulation of hazardous wastewater at the surface; and the booming indus-
try's highly visible environmental and community impacts." In addition,
seismic testing, round-the-clock drilling operations, and the constant coming and going of
large diesel-fueled trucks.").
6. Fracking is a process used to stimulate producing formations-such as oil and
gas shales, coal beds, tight sandstones, carbonate, and sandstone-and to enhance recovery
of oil or natural gas, by pumping a mixture of water, gels, and other substances-including
chemicals, diesel fuels, and/or propping agents-into the target geologic formation under
extreme pressure, causing a network of fissures in the rock formations that provide the oth-
erwise trapped oil or natural gas a pathway to travel to the well for extraction. For a diagram
of the fracking process, see Graham Roberts, Mika Gr6ndahl & Bill Marsh, Extracting Natu-
ral Gas from Rock, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/27/us/fracking.html.
7. Ctr. for Energy Econ. & Policy, A Review of Shale Gas Regulations by State,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE,
http://www.rff.org/centers/energyeconomicsandpolicy/Pages/Shale-Maps.aspx (last
updated May 22, 2013); see also NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, PROTECTING AMERICANS
FROM THE RISKS OF FRACKING 2 (2012), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/frackingrisks.pdf (identifying approximately thirty states
with active fracking operations).
8. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LOWER 48 STATES SHALE PLAYS 1 (2011),
available at http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/rpd/shale gas.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Henry D. Jacoby, Francis M. O'Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, The Influ-
ence of Shale Gas on US. Energy and Environmental Policy, I ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL.
POL'Y 37 (2012) (demonstrating shale gas benefits to national economy and greenhouse
emissions reductions); Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Rev-
olution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 145, 157-61 (2013) (detailing economic benefits of fracking); see also N.Y. STATE
DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT: SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 17
(2011), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull091 1.pdf (estimating posi-
tive economic impacts of fracking in New York State).
10. See Rena 1. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New (New)
Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 184 (1996) ("No
contemporary environmental problem cuts to the quick of public anxiety more than the safety
of our drinking water .... ").
11. The environmental and community impacts have been the subject of extensive
reportage. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Drilling Down Series, N.Y. TIMES,
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some industry critics have argued that the newfound abundance of fossil
fuels affords the country a diversion from the increased renewable energy
production and eventually carbon-free economy necessary to combat cli-
mate change and ensure economic and environmental sustainability in a
post-peak oil world. 2 The controversy surrounding these issues has been
exacerbated because fracking is exempt in important ways from several
federal environmental laws, including the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA), 3 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 4 and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA). 5
The debate over who should regulate fracking-the federal govern-
ment or the states-has followed a parallel track to the broader cultural de-
bates, and the corresponding rhetorical alliances are well established. Those
who envision private profit and the expansion of American power tend to
favor state regulation. Those who fear environmental and public health
risks, along with the perpetuation of the fossil fuel economy, tend to favor
federal regulation. Putting aside these apparent precommitments, however,
the question of the appropriate scale of fracking regulation also engages
with a number of underexamined theoretical concerns, which I group to-
gether under the rubric of "federalism choice" analysis. 6 This analysis
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/us/DRILLINGDOWNSERIES.html (last updated
May 15, 2012); Fracking: Gas Drilling's Environmental Threat, PROPUBLICA,
http://www.propublica.org/series/fracking (last updated Aug. 13, 2013); see also GASLAND
(HBO Documentary Films 2010); GASLAND PART II (HBO Documentary Films 2013);
NatGasNow, The Truth About Gasland, YouTUBE (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player embedded&v='YIW8MnveFq8 (arguing, in
a film produced by America's Natural Gas Alliance, that Gasland "is a deeply flawed docu-
mentary" and "gets several important facts wrong").
12. See, e.g., Daniel P. Schrag, Is Shale Gas Good for Climate Change?, 141
DEDALUS 72, 77-78 (2012) (arguing that natural gas production is in competition with de-
velopment of renewable energy and carbon capture and storage technologies); Jacoby,
O'Sullivan & Paltsev, supra note 9, at 50 (concluding that shale gas development hinders
investments in renewable energy and carbon capture and storage technologies); see also
ENERGY MODELING FORUM, STANFORD UNIV., CHANGING THE GAME?: EMISSIONS AND
MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF NEW NATURAL GAS SUPPLIES 16 (2013), available at
http://emf.stanford.edu/files/pubs/22532/Summary26.pdf (predicting that increased natural
gas production will have little impact on long-term domestic greenhouse gas emissions be-
cause it will displace renewable and nuclear energy production and because economic
growth will increase energy use).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300fto 300j-26 (2006 & Supp. 2012).
14. Id. §§ 6901-6992k.
15. Id. §§ 11001-11050. Fracking, as an oil and gas exploration and production
activity, is also exempt from the stormwater permit provisions of the Clean Water Act. See
33 U.S.C. § 1342(1) (2006 & Supp. 2012); 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(2), (c)(1)(iii), (e)(8) (2013);
see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 526 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2008) (vacating oil and
gas construction stormwater regulation).
16. See Michael Burger, Consistency Conflicts and Federalism Choice: Marine
Spatial Planning Beyond the States' Territorial Seas, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10602 (2011).
2013:14831486
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acknowledges that governments possess a number of options available to
answer the question of whether regulation of a given activity (such as frack-
ing) or environmental or public health impact (such as groundwater contam-
ination or greenhouse gas emissions) should flow from a global, national,
state, or local level and seeks to discern which level of governance is most
appropriate by considering a number of different factors.
This Article argues that a federalism-choice analysis favors shared
federal-state regulation of potential impacts on underground drinking-water
supplies and of hazardous waste management, and federal regulation of
information disclosure, under the existing regimes created by our nation's
environmental laws. Curiously, despite the resources devoted to both politi-
cal and public campaigns on either side of fracking's federalism question,
the scholarship to date on the issue is sparse, and what little there is tends to
favor the status quo, including state regulation of potential drinking-water
contamination, hazardous waste management, and toxic chemical release
information disclosure. 7 But theoretical arguments in favor of the status quo
underestimate the threat they pose to the existing environmental law para-
17. See, e.g., David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2013); Merrill & Schizer, supra
note 9, at 201-62; Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 971, 985-89 (2013). The fracking federalism discourse has been deeply informed by the
extensive studies conducted by Hannah Wiseman on fracking regulation, enforcement, and
regulatory gaps at various scales. See Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Dise-
conomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Wiseman, Diseconomies
of Scale]; Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV.
729 (2013) [hereinafter Wiseman, Risk and Response]; Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regu-
lation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 361 (2012); Hannah Jacobs Wiseman & Fran-
cis Gradijan, Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing (Univ.
of Tulsa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-11), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1953547; Hannah Wiseman, Untested
Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit
Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115 (2009) [hereinafter Wiseman, Untested Wa-
ters]; Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 229 (2010) [hereinafter Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation]; Hannah Wiseman, Trade
Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 1 (2011). Environmental advocacy groups have also examined regulatory failures,
particularly at the state level and advocated increased federal involvement. See, e.g.,
MATTHEW MCFEELEY, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, STATE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
DISCLOSURE RULES AND ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARISON (2012), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/Fracking-Disclosure-IB.pdf. Industry groups have opposed
new federal regulatory measures. AM. PETROLEUM INST., "THE PRESIDENT'S BACKWARD
ENERGY POLICY WON'T HELP LOWER GASOLINE PRICES": ENERGY MYTHS & FACTS 2 (2012),
available at http://www.api.org/-/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/Energy-Myths-and-
Facts.pdf (arguing that a "potential avalanche of new rules will discourage further natural gas
development"). The dynamics of competing political, environmental, and industry federalism
agendas is theorized and examined in Charles Davis & Katherine Hoffer, Federalizing Ener-
gy? Agenda Change and the Politics of Fracking, 45 POL'Y Sci. 221 (2012).
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digm. The relevant statutes addressed here-SDWA, RCRA, and EPCRA-
are all designed to protect against particular adverse environmental and pub-
lic health impacts. Thus, if states represent the proper scale at which to
regulate these impacts in regards to fracking, then, in theory, they must be
the proper scale at which to regulate these impacts for other activities, too.
Such a conclusion undermines existing federal protections in a fundamental
way. Yet, the conclusion necessarily follows, unless there is something dis-
tinctive about fracking that makes its impacts different from-and somehow
less than-those associated with other activities that produce the same im-
pacts. To date, no one has explained why this should be. Nor can they. For
while there may well be economic, political, geo-political, or even environ-
mental reasons to encourage the further expansion of the fracking industry, 8
there is no plausible justification under a theoretical federalism analysis to
treat it differently from any other polluting activity.
The purpose of this Article, then, is to defend environmental law's
federalism choices from the insinuation that they do not match fracking's
environmental impacts and to demonstrate that fracking does indeed belong
under the umbrella of federal law. The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I
establishes the federalism-choice analysis framework and applies it to both
state and federal regulation of fracking. Part II buttresses the conclusion that
federal regulation of potential impacts on underground drinking-water sup-
plies is appropriate through a fresh and extensive examination of the statuto-
ry scheme and legislative history of SDWA. Part III offers further support
for federal law's applicability to fracking through a more abbreviated look
at RCRA and EPCRA. Part V details the ongoing trend toward federaliza-
tion of fracking regulation under environmental law, offers a new federal-
ism analysis of several possible regulatory measures, and proposes that, in
the absence of direct federal regulation, either the federal government or the
states should ramp up efforts to promote policy diffusion and the spread of
best practices. A brief conclusion follows.
I. FRACKING AND FEDERALISM CHOICE
Questions of environmental federalism are often answered through
one of three filters: dual federalism, cooperative federalism, and the "match-
ing principle."' 9 Dual federalism is most frequently invoked in judicial opin-
18. See, e.g., JOHN D. PODESTA & TIMOTHY E. WIRTII, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
NATURAL GAS: A BRIDGE FUEL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2009), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2009/08/pdf/naturalgasmemo.pd
f. But see J. DAVID HUGHES, POST CARBON INST., WILL NATURAL GAS FUEL AMERICA IN THE
21 ST CENTURY? (2011), available at http://www.postcarbon.org/reports/PCl-report-nat-gas-
future.pdf.
19. The contours of environmental federalism as a distinct subfield of federalism
theory have been well drawn elsewhere. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and
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ions and in scholarship that emphasizes the centrality of state autonomy to
"Our Federalism." 20 It possesses at least three essential characteristics: it
emphasizes conflict between federal and state governments; it views the
federal government as one of limited purposes and powers; and it maintains
that the states and the federal government are sovereign within their sepa-
rate spheres.2' Cooperative federalism, by contrast, derives from statutory
origins rather than constitutional ones. 2' Rather than divide governance in
the United States into exclusive power domains, it seeks to legitimate the
partnerships that pervade federal-state relations. Accordingly, it emphasizes
partnership between federal and state governments rather than conflict;
views the federal government as one of expansive powers and purposes; and
maintains that the states and the federal government often operate in areas
of overlapping authority and jurisdiction.23 Meanwhile, scholars seeking to
Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Envi-
ronmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H.
Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dy-
namic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Jonathan H. Adler,
Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005).
For an interesting critique of the "muddle" of environmental federalism theory, see David A.
Dana, One Green America: Continuities and Discontinuities in Environmental Federalism in
the United States, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 104-11 (2013).
20. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (using the term to refer to "a proper
respect for state functions [and a] belief that the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways"). For a concise account of the arguments for and against the accuracy of the autono-
my/sovereignty model of dual federalism, see Heather K. Gerken, Foreward: Federalism All
the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-21 (2010). See also ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND
THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 109-44 (2012); and ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC
FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 32-37 (2009). Although
dual sovereignty has largely been displaced in this area by the cooperative federalism
frameworks of statutory environmental law, it nonetheless remains a vital element of consti-
tutional law issues that arise in environmental law scenarios, including preemption cases,
Dormant Commerce Clause cases, and Tenth Amendment challenges to federal environmen-
tal laws.
21. See Gerken, supra note 20.
22. See id. at 18-20 (identifying public law areas-including environmental law,
consumer protection law, financial regulation, and telecommunications law-where dual
sovereignty account of "Our Federalism" falls short); see also RYAN, supra note 20, at 145-
80; SCHAPIRO, supra note 20, at 40-47.
23. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013) (applying Chev-
ron deference to agency interpretation of jurisdictional reach under federal statute); Gerken,
supra note 20, at 19 ("These institutional arrangements feature a powerful national govern-
ment with its finger in every regulatory pie, integrated and interdependent state and federal
regimes, states wielding power that is not their own, and a complex administrative structure
involving a variegated set of state and local decisionmakers."); see also Philip J. Weiser,
Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663
(2001); Joseph F. Zimmerman, National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the
Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS 15 (2001). But see Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421
1489
Michigan State Law Review
identify an appropriate level of regulatory authority over one or another
environmental problem often invoke the "matching principle" and attempt
to "match" the jurisdiction to the scale and scope of the problem.24
In the last few decades, environmental and constitutional law scholars
have also developed theoretical frameworks in which to analyze questions
of federalism choice. Several rationales are usually proffered to justify ar-
guments in favor of federalization, or centralization, of environmental law.
First, the problem of interstate externalities requires a federal response.
25
Second, federalization counteracts the problem of the "race to the bottom,"
in which state and local governments caught in a prisoner's dilemma lower
environmental standards to potentially harmful levels in order to attract in-
dustry.26 Third, federal uniformity in the regulation of products manufac-
tured for and distributed on a national scale may be desirable, 7 as uniform
standards provide economic efficiencies to regulated entities.2 8 Fourth, cen-
U.S. 60, 64 (1975) (describing cooperative federalism regime instituted by the 1970 Clean
Air Act amendments as Congress "taking a stick to the States").
24. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 23, 25 (1996); Adler, supra note 19, at 158-60.
25. In economics, externalities are spillover costs or adverse consequences imposed
on non-parties to a transaction. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Prob-
lems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86
YALE L.J. 1196, 1215-16 (1977) (explaining that spillover costs are insufficiently accounted
for in decentralized governance); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmen-
tal Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996) (arguing that federal law has not effectively
addressed the problems arising from interstate externalities).
26. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the "Race-to-the-Bottom " Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1210 (1992) [hereinafter Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition]; Peter P.
Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competi-
tion Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 67 (1996);
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to the
Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and
Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997)
[hereinafter Revesz, A Response to Critics]; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environ-
mental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001); see also Rich-
ard Webster, Federal Environmental Enforcement: Is Less More?, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 303 (2007) (arguing that a race to the bottom exists in relation to enforcement).
27. See Revesz, A Response to Critics, supra note 26, at 544 ("Uniformity ... can
be desirable for products with important economies of scale in production."); Alan Schwartz,
Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 6-10 (2000) (discussing "inefficiencies" associated with disparate
state standards); James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a
Federal System-and Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1240-41 (1995) (arguing that
uniform standards under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act had proven "foolish").
28. But see, e.g., Engel, supra note 26, at 369 (noting that uniform standards benefit
industry by stifling competition and freeing it from having to satisfy diversity of require-
ments); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling
1490 2013:1483
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tralization can effectively pool resources for gathering technical infor-
mation, generating scientific knowledge, creating durable rules, and provid-
ing for enforcement.29 Fifth, centralization may enable a different balance of
interest group influence, as groups excluded from local political and devel-
opment machines may gain greater voice at the federal level.3" Sixth, feder-
alization can overcome NIMBYism, the "not in my backyard" attitude often
evident in conflicts surrounding the siting of hazardous waste disposal sites
and other locally undesirable land uses.3' Finally-and importantly in re-
gards to fracking-federalization may respond to the sense of a national
moral imperative.32
On the other side of the debate, several rationales have come to domi-
nate arguments in favor of devolution, or decentralization, of environmental
law. First, decentralization may enable decision making that is both more
democratic33 and more responsive to local preferences.34 Second, innovation
can occur when states and localities act as "laboratories of democracy" or
experimentation.35 Third, decentralization may enable decision making that
is tailored more narrowly to variable local environmental conditions.36
Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102
Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 599 n.95 (2008) (noting that uniform standards are "more concerned
with reducing regulatory burdens than improving the effectiveness of environmental regula-
tion").
29. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 19, at 1104.
30. See Stewart, supra note 25, at 1213-15; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environ-
mental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 598 (1996).
31. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND
FAIRNESS IN TOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING (1994); Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of
NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994) (discussing NIMBY responses to waste disposal
facilities, low-income housing, and social service centers); Barak D. Richman & Christopher
Boemer, A Transaction Cost Economizing Approach to Regulation: Understanding the
NIMB Y Problem and Improving Regulatory Responses, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 29 (2006).
32. See Stewart, supra note 25, at 1221-22.
33. The benefits of scaling down for democracy have been at the core of much of
the scholarship on localism. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Fed-
eralism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1990); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Goodfor Localism? The Local-
ist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 189-95 (2005) [hereinafter Hills, Is Feder-
alism Good for Localism?] (distinguishing "democratic decentralization" from "managerial
decentralization").
34. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive
Through Decentralization: The Case For Subsidiarity, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1377 (2004).
35. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."); David L. Markell, States as Innova-
tors: It's Time for a New Look to Our "Laboratories of Democracy" in the Effort to Improve
Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REv. 347 (1994).
36. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 25, at 1219-20; Esty, supra note 30, at 606-07.
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Fourth, decentralization can enable adaptive management or other experi-
mentalist or "New Governance" regimes.37 Fifth, decentralization might
spur inter-jurisdictional competition, which can lead to economically effi-
cient regulation38 or even a "race to the top."39
In the remainder of this Section, I apply these frameworks to fracking.
For the purposes of this Article, "fracking" refers not just to the moment
when an operator literally fractures an unconventional formation, but also to
the exploration and production process of which that is a part.4" In brief, that
process entails the following: after the necessary testing has determined that
oil and gas are present in a given site and after acquisition of the necessary
rights and permits to drill, an operator constructs the well site and, if neces-
sary, the access road to it. The operator then carries in the requisite water,
sand, chemicals, equipment, and facilities; mixes the chemicals and sand
with the water to create his "fracking fluid"; and begins drilling. In the un-
conventional formations where fracking occurs, the operator will drill down
thousands of feet-often well below most conventional oil and gas reserves
and most, if not all, likely underground drinking-water supplies-by apply-
ing various drilling muds and fluids to the rock. Drilling, and the production
that follows, results in natural water from the formation-called "produced
water"-rising through the well to the surface. The operator will store the
produced water-which may contain high levels of salts and brines, as well
as naturally occurring radioactive material-in a pit or enclosed tank at the
site. The operator will then dispose of the produced water either through
underground injection into a separate disposal well (for which it will need a
permit issued under SDWA), through discharge into a wastewater treatment
plant (for which it will need a permit issued under the CWA) or through
land application (for which it may require a permit under state law). Next,
the operator hydraulically fractures the formation by injecting millions of
gallons of highly pressurized water mixed with chemicals and proppants
37. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regula-
tory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943 (2003); Brad-
ley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration, 2002 Wis. L. REV.
555; Charles Sabel, Archon Fung & Bradley Karkkainen, Beyond Backyard Environmental-
ism, in BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000);
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1997). But see Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323
(2009).
38. See, e.g., Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 26.
39. See generally Michael Burger, "It's Not Easy Being Green ": Local Initiatives,
Preemption Problems, and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 835 (2010).
See also Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide Products Revisited: Federal-
ism, Green Building Codes, and Appliance Efficiency Standards, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
335, 363 (2010) (discussing the "ratchet" approach to energy efficiency standards used in
Japan and Australia).
40. See generally Wiseman, Risk and Response, supra note 17.
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down the well. The pressure causes perforations in the well, through which
chemicals and proppants flow into the rock. Some of the water and chemi-
cals return through the well to the surface-so-called "flowback water"-
and are stored in a pit or tank before disposal or reuse. Finally, after the oil
or gas has been extracted, the operator completes the well, or else plugs and
abandons it.
41
Throughout this process, there are numerous opportunities for air pol-
lution, water pollution, hazardous waste spills, and toxic chemical releases.
The process entails the release of toxic chemicals into the environment; the
transport, storage, handling, and disposal of hazardous waste and toxic
chemicals; and the potential to contaminate underground drinking supplies
through any of a number of potential surface and subsurface pathways.42
These facts necessarily form the basis for the federalism choice analysis that
follows. Here, I begin with what I believe is the weaker set of arguments in
favor of allocating primary regulatory authority to the states. It is imperative
to remember throughout this recitation that this approach allows states the
option of not regulating at all, as it presumes that no federal minimum
standards have been set under SDWA, RCRA, or EPCRA. I then turn to
what I believe is the stronger set of arguments in favor of federal interven-
tion.
A. The Theoretical Arguments for State Regulation
Several theoretical rationales typically offered in support of allocating
regulatory authority to the states are relevant in this context. First, the geol-
ogy, geography, hydrography, hydrology, and other local environmental
conditions-including differences in population density and the presence of
rare or protected resources--differ among the various formations and shale
plays.43 These differences must be accounted for in any regulatory regime or
41. See Oil and Gas Well Drilling and Servicing eTool, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN.,
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/well completion/well completion.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2014).
42. As discussed further below, the "pathways" of drinking water contamination are
presently the subject of a much-watched EPA report, which is expected to be issued in 2014.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 601/R-12/011, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT (2012) [here-
inafter 2011 EPA REPORT], available at
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/hf-report20121214.pdf, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-1 1/122, PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 34-41 (2011), available at
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hf study-plan-
110211 _final 508.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Tom Myers, Potential Contaminant Pathways from Hydraulically
Fractured Shale to Aquifers, 50 GROUNDWATER 872, 875 (2012).
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permitting program. Second, different communities and political constituen-
cies experience different levels of risk tolerance and weigh differently the
balance between the jobs and economic growth that may come with frack-
ing and the potential for adverse environmental, public health, and commu-
nity character impacts.' Third, allowing states to serve as "laboratories" for
experimentation and innovation can produce a diversity of technologies and
regulatory approaches that can improve environmental performance and
achieve economic efficiency without sacrificing the aforementioned politi-
cal preferences. 5 Finally, allocation to the state level may plausibly result in
greater voice and democratic participation than would result from a federal
regime by permitting local citizens who would otherwise opt out or be shut
out from the decision-making process to participate in it.
However, only the last of these rationales is persuasive. As discussed
in Section I.B, the benefits of local tailoring to environmental conditions
and political preferences, and the possibility that states may serve as "labor-
atories" of experimentation and innovation, are also captured by the cooper-
ative federalism regimes established under SDWA, RCRA, and other envi-
ronmental statutes.46 Moreover, as discussed in Section IV.C, the evidence
available shows that the "laboratories" rationale has fallen short in practice.
State regulatory regimes remain inconsistent, with some states actively
seeking to address the problems generated by fracking, and others not.47 The
result is a highly variable regulatory terrain that leaves many significant
gaps unfilled.48
44. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP'TOF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 9; N.C. DEP'T
OF ENV'T & NATURAL RES. & N.C. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NORTH CAROLINA OIL AND GAS
STUDY UNDER SESSION LAW 2011-276 (2012), available at
http://portal.ncdenr.org/c/documentlibrary/get file?uuid=9a3b 1cc 1-484f-4265-877e-
4ae1 2af0f765&groupld=14; Discussion Draft of Regulations Hydraulic Fracturing Regula-
tions Banner, CAL. DEP'T OF CONSERVATION (2012),
http://www.conservation.ca.gov/index/Pages/hfrk-discussiondraft.aspx; 225 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 732/1 (2013); see also Merrill & Schizer, supra note 9, at 256 (noting that differences
between state property rights regimes may influence allocation of authority to states).
45. See infra Part IV.
46. See infra Section I.B.
47. See, e.g., Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 17, at 167 (discussing the vari-
ous tiers at which states are regulating fracking operations).
48. See Wiseman & Gradijan, supra note 17, at 108-09 tbl.10a; Wiseman, Untested
Waters, supra note 17, at 167 ("Most states are, at minimum, collecting data on the fracing
fluids used and the formation that has been fractured. A few address groundwater withdrawal
and disposal concerns specific to fracing. And still fewer allow public participation in the
decision to grant a permit to drill and frac, beyond complaints of traditional neighboring
landowner concerns such as drainage of the oil and gas beneath their property. Few states
have banned the use of hazardous fracing fluids, and few have specifically addressed the
concerns that arise where fractures extend further than anticipated and enable fracturing
fluids to flow into neighboring formations."); Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation, supra note
17, at 235 (concluding that "progress has been made in reducing the risk of surface contami-
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David Spence has taken an alternative approach to fracking federalism
analysis-applying the "matching principle" and arguing that current scien-
tific information indicates that the impacts of fracking are largely local, and
so the proper scale of governance is, for the most part, at the state level.49 As
noted above, fracking's impacts include air emissions, such as methane
emissions and volatile organic compound emissions; potential groundwater
contamination from underground injection and surface spills; and surface
water contamination from hazardous wastewater management and disposal
and stormwater runoff." Other impacts include water supply depletion, al-
teration of community character and landscapes, and increased nonporous
surface area." Some of these impacts are easy enough to allocate to one or
another level of government under the matching principle: water supply
depletion and community character and landscape impacts may generally be
considered localized impacts properly regulated under state or local law. 2
Methane emissions that commingle with other greenhouse gases in the at-
mosphere and contribute to climate change should be considered national or
international impacts properly regulated under federal law. 3
But many of fracking's impacts are more difficult to "match." Should
localized emissions of hazardous air pollutants be regulated solely by the
states? What about contamination of drinking-water supplies that do not
cross state lines and are not sold into interstate commerce? What about haz-
ardous waste spills into soils or waters that never directly cross state lines?
What about stormwater runoff into local streams or creeks? Read literally,
the matching principle might well allocate all of these impacts to the states.
However, our nation's environmental laws-Clean Air Act (CAA), SDWA,
RCRA, and CWA-have allocated authority over these impacts to coopera-
tive federalism regimes that provide for minimum national standards and
state implementation, largely because the environmental and public health
impacts were found to implicate national interests and because state regula-
nation from fracing activities but that more is needed in some areas" and that "[i]n light of
the current absence of federal regulation of several stages of the fracing process, states and
the federal government must reevaluate the assumption that individual state regulations con-
sistently and adequately fill each and every federal gap").
49. See generally Spence, supra note 17.
50. See, e.g., id. at 483-93; Wiseman, Risk and Response, supra note 17, at 753-75,
778-94, 799-808.
51. Spence, supra note 17, at 479-82; Wiseman, Risk and Response, supra note 17,
at 775-79, 794-99.
52. However, there are important exceptions to this conclusion. First, water supply
depletion may be subject to an interstate compact governing surface water or aquifer use.
Second, water supply depletion in a time of extended drought, such as that being experienced
in the American Southwest, may begin to raise issues that are more regional or national in
scope. Third, as discussed further below, community character and landscape impacts can, if
widespread, become an issue of greater-than-local concern. See infra Subsection I.B.3.
53. See Spence, supra note 17, at 483-87 (discussing methane emissions).
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tion had proven insufficient. Fracking has been exempted from these federal
laws in significant ways; however, none of those exemptions relies on either
the theoretical factors discussed above or on the matching principle.54
David Schizer and Tom Merrill also argue that states are the proper
scale of governance, positing that regulatory authority over oil and gas ex-
ploration and production on private property has, as a historical matter, been
left to the states and that this historical fact weighs in favor of leaving frack-
ing's legislative and regulatory exemptions in place.55 However, states' his-
toric regulation of conventional oil and gas exploration and production ac-
tivities does not justify exempting fracking from SDWA, RCRA, or
EPCRA. For one thing, conventional oil and gas exploration and production
activities-and other enhanced recovery activities including fracking that
use diesel fuel-are in fact regulated by SDWA.56 In addition, the EPA's
decisions to exempt oil and gas exploration and production from RCRA and
EPCRA are not statutorily required; rather, they represent discretionary
actions that were made based on then-current technologies and the scale of
conventional oil and gas production. These regulatory exemptions have not
yet accounted for the chemical content of fracking fluids, the sudden and
extraordinary expansion of unconventional oil and gas production in this
country, or new technologies that make waste management economically
feasible.57 In short, then, history does not favor state regulation of fracking's
potential impacts. Rather, it highlights the primary reason the federal gov-
ernment has been slow to react to what may have otherwise been an activity
that very rapidly fell under federal law.
It bears noting here that politicians, bureaucrats, and industry groups
who favor state regulation have focused on a handful of talking points that
bear little relation to these loftier theoretical considerations. 8 First and
foremost, political proponents of state regulation argue that fracking has
been around for a long time-since the middle of the twentieth century59-
and it is environmentally safe. Along these same lines, advocates of state
regulation maintain that there are no known instances of groundwater con-
54. See infra Parts I-11 (discussing exemptions).
55. See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 9, at 151, 251-53.
56. See infra notes 144-56 and accompanying text (discussing statutory scheme).
57. See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (discussing petitions).
58. For a codification of these talking points, see, for example, AM. LEGISLATIVE
EXCH. COUNCIL, RESOLUTION TO RETAIN STATE AUTHORITY OVER HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
(n.d.), available at http://s3.documcntcloud.org/documents/346244/alec-resolution-to-retain-
state-authority-over.pdf. For an analysis of its use as political rhetoric, see Davis & Hoffer,
supra note 17.
59. Jennifer L. Miskimins, Jeff Johnson & Mark Turner, The Technical Aspects of
Hydraulic Fracturing, in HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: CORE ISSUES AND TRENDS 1, 1-4 (Rocky
Mountain Mineral L. Found. 2011) (identifying 1947 as the year of the first frack); Coastal
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2008) (identifying 1949 as
the year of the first commercial frack).
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tamination from fracking.6° This number-zero--is critical to the rhetorical
force of the argument and explains the zeal with which reports of contami-
nation of groundwater in Dimock, Pennsylvania and Pavillion, Wyoming
have been contested.6 Proponents also argue that states already regulate
fracking under their oil and gas regulatory programs and additional regula-
tion is unnecessary;6" that federal regulation will add costs, reduce the num-
ber of projects, and thereby threaten the nation's energy security;63 and that
variable geology and geography require state expertise and local
knowledge.6' Of these political arguments, only two are relevant to theoreti-
cal analysis: the argument that state regulation is sufficient and the local
tailoring argument. As we shall soon see, though, there are significant gaps
in state regulation, and local conditions are explicitly accounted for under
SDWA.
B. The Theoretical Arguments for Federal Regulation
There are three main points to be made in support of the theoretical
argument that regulation of fracking should be allocated to the cooperative
federalism regimes of SDWA and RCRA and to the federal Toxic Release
Inventory program (TRI) implemented under the EPCRA. First, the theoret-
ical benefits of state-level regulation are effectively captured by cooperative
federalism structures, in which states assume primacy, or are delegated au-
thority by developing an approvable regulatory program, while the federal
presence garners benefits unavailable in a state regulation regime. Second,
60. But see Jim Efstathiou, Jr. & Mark Drajem, Drillers Silence Fracking Claims
with Sealed Settlements, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013 -06-06/drillers-silence-fracking-claims-with-sealed-
settlements.html (describing confidential settlements of private lawsuits and administrative
complaints filed against fracking companies for drinking water contamination).
61. For a neat summary of the messy business surrounding the EPA's study of po-
tential drinking water supply contamination in Wyoming, see PETER FOLGER, MARY
TIEMANN & DAVID M. BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42327, THE EPA DRAFT REPORT
OF GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING: MAIN FINDINGS AND
STAKEHOLDER RESPONSES 1-2 (2012). For a short summary of the Dimock controversy, see
Michael Rubinkam, Dimock, PA Water Tests Conducted by EPA Amid Fracking Concerns,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2012, 9:10 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/25/dimock-pa-water n_ 1702992.html.
62. See Spence, supra note 17, at 507; Merrill & Schizer, supra note 9, at 253-57;
see also Charles Davis, The Politics of "Fracking ": Regulating Natural Gas Drilling Prac-
tices in Colorado and Texas, 29 REV. POL'Y RES. 177, 181-82 (2012).
63. But see INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS:
WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK SPECIAL REPORT ON UNCONVENTIONAL GAS 53 (Robert Priddle
ed., 2012), available at
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2012_GoldenRulesReport
.pdf (estimating that regulation will increase the cost of natural gas by 7%).
64. See, e.g., AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 58.
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even in the absence of direct interstate externalities, the environmental stat-
utes reflect the interstate nature of drinking water, hazardous waste, and
toxic chemical release impacts, as well as the federal interest in those im-
pacted resources and the public health. Third, the rapid development of
fracking and its tremendous scale have increased the likelihood that the in-
dustry is producing previously under-accounted cumulative effects, as well
as impacts on American communities that potentially implicate national
moral concerns.
1. The Benefits of Cooperative Federalism
The cooperative federalism structures of SDWA, RCRA, the CWA,
and the CAA are all designed to capture the benefits that inure to state regu-
lation of environmental pollution without sacrificing a baseline of protec-
tiveness that ensures greater equality, and environmental and public health,
across the country.65 In particular, state primacy under SDWA and state
delegated authority under RCRA (as well as the CWA and CAA) allow
states to apply local knowledge and to tailor their permitting to local envi-
ronmental conditions; to respond to local democratic preferences to either
surpass federal minimum standards or to simply abide by them; to increase
citizen voice; and to engage in technical and regulatory experimentation that
can help inform their own and others' further regulatory choices.66 Thus,
with cooperative federalism, the federal government's intrusion into the
"market" for regulatory options accommodates many of the primary con-
cerns voiced by the theoretical argument for state regulation while also en-
suring a degree of interstate equality and protection of human health and the
environment.
2. The Federal Interest in Drinking Water, Hazardous Waste
Management, and Toxic Release Information Disclosure
The relevant environmental statutes and their legislative histories all
reflect earlier congressional determinations that drinking water, hazardous
waste management, and toxic release information disclosure are matters that
involve sufficient federal interests to warrant federal regulation, regardless
of whether individual pollution events transgress state borders or whether
65. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and
the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695-703 (2001) (discussing
the character of and rationales for cooperative federalism).
66. See id. at 1699-703.
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adverse effects are felt in multiple jurisdictions.67 But for the EPA's discre-
tionary exemptions to RCRA and EPCRA for the oil and gas industry, and
the so-called "Halliburton Loophole" carved into SDWA for fracking alone,
fracking would already fall under these statutes. These exemptions, howev-
er, derive from technical analyses that are, at the very least, outdated and
from a political decision that appears to reflect a unique instance of legisla-
tive capture.68 There is little support to be found in these decisions, other
than the simple fact of them, for keeping fracking's impacts out from the
purview of federal law.69
Although the federal statutes were born of a concern about inadequate
state standards and enforcement practices that may have resulted from a
"race to the bottom," there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to sup-
port the conclusion that states are currently engaged in such a "race" to se-
cure the presence of the fracking industry and the economic benefits it os-
tensibly brings."0 Yet, states do fall along a range of regulation, from the
laissez-faire to the outright prohibition. Given the existing range, there are
additional benefits to be gained from an increased federal presence and the
imposition of federal minimum standards. First, the patchwork of regulation
and non-regulation denies the American citizenry a baseline of protective-
ness. Federal minimum standards would ensure some level of national uni-
formity. Second, an increased presence would enable the federal govern-
ment to take a more active role in resource pooling and knowledge sharing.
The importance of these informational and institutional benefits are already
visible in two EPA decisions, one to require some chemical information
disclosure under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),7' the other to
undertake its groundwater contamination study.72
3. Cumulative Effects and National Interests
Finally, earlier analyses of fracking's federalism choice question have
not fully accounted for the rapidly expanding industry's cumulative ef-
fects.73 Fracking operations, which essentially doubled in number to more
67. See infra notes 115, 170, 201, 268 (discussing SDWA purposes and legislative
history); infra notes 219-22 (discussing RCRA purposes); infra notes 224-25 (discussing
EPCRA purposes).
68. See infra note 191 (discussing Halliburton loophole history).
69. See Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable
Energy, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1679, 1704-11 (2012).
70. See Spence, supra note 17, at 463 (discussing the race to the bottom).
71. See infra notes 97-192 and accompanying text (discussing TSCA petition).
72. See infra Part II (discussing the EPA groundwater contamination study).
73. See Wiseman, Diseconomies of Scale, supra note 17 (discussing distinct scaling
problems caused by independent-but-cumulative risks, interdependent harms, and uneven
impacts).
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than 500,000 wells between 1990 in 2010,14 continue to rapidly expand
across the United States. Companies in Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana,
Montana, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming collectively reported that
"18,158 wells were readied for production or were newly producing" be-
tween April 2011 and the end of 201 1. 5 In 2012, more than 22,000 new
wells were fracked.76 Some states, such as North Dakota and Pennsylvania,
have seen particularly dramatic increases in the scale of fracking opera-
tions.77 Meanwhile, California is said to be sitting on a shale oil reserve
larger than the Bakken,78 and fracking has begun or is expected to soon
begin in states where it previously did not exist, such as Illinois.79
It is inarguable that this rush of activity has resulted in an overall in-
creased risk of environmental pollution and an overall increased number of
pollution events.8" Quite simply, the more wells there are, the more likely it
is that there will be drinking-water contamination events (whether it be from
the remote risk that injection of fracking fluids will contaminate groundwa-
ter or the higher risk that improper casing or well construction will), as well
as hazardous wastewater spills, chemical spills, methane leaks, and so on.8'
74. Dan Vergano, Natural Gas Gold Rush: Is Your State Next?, USA TODAY (July
2, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-05-29/fracking-
environment-gas/55845708/1 (asserting that there were 510,000 wells in 2010).
75. See Benjamin Haas et al., Fracking Hazards Obscured in Failure to Disclose
Wells, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2012, 6:26 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-
14/fracking-hazards-obscured-in-failure-to-disclose-wells.html.
76. ELIZABETH RIDLINGTON, FRONTIER GRP. & JOHN RUMPLER, ENV'T AM.
RESEARCH & POLICY CTR., FRACKING BY THE NUMBERS: KEY IMPACTS OF DIRTY DRILLING AT
THE STATE AND NATIONAL LEVEL 20 (2013), available at
http://www.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA-FrackingNumbers s
cm.pdf.
77. See Joe Carroll, Fracking Market to Grow 19%o to $37 Billion Worldwide in
2012, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 19, 2012, 5:34 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-
19/frack-market-to-grow-19-in-2012-to-37-billion-correct-.html (discussing new production
on the Bakken shale formation, which lies beneath North Dakota and Montana, and the Mar-
cellus shale formation, which lies beneath Pennsylvania).
78. Jane Wells, California's Monterey Shale, the Next Oil Boom?, CNBC.cOM (Feb.
21, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/10048005I/print; see also U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., REVIEW OF EMERGING RESOURCES: U.S. SHALE GAS AND SHALE OIL PLAYS (2011),
available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/usshalegas/pdf/usshaleplays.pdf (noting that
the Monterey and Santos shale formations, which underlie 1,752 square miles of the San
Joaquin and Los Angeles basins, are estimated to hold upwards of fifteen billion barrels of
oil, which equates to approximately 64% of the shale oil).
79. See Kerry Lester, Illinois Fracking Bill: State Legislature Passes Nation's
Toughest Fracking Regulations, HUFFINGTON POST (May 31, 2013, 11:06 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/01/illinois-fracking-bill-st n 3371690.html.
80. See Wiseman, Diseconomies of Scale, supra note 17 (discussing independent
harms).
81. See Wiseman, Risk and Response, supra note 17, at 746, 765-66 (describing
methane leaks, wastewater spills, and leaks from pits and tanks); ROYAL SOC'Y & ROYAL
ACAD. OF ENG'G, SHALE GAS EXTRACTION IN THE UK: A REVIEW OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
2013:14831500
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As Hannah Wiseman notes, while "the [probability] of a problematic inci-
dent occurring at any one shale gas or oil site [has] not, in many cases, risen
substantially... when one multiplies this risk by nearly 2,000, as in Penn-
sylvania, or 16,000 in the case of north central Texas, it is substantially dif-
ferent. 8 2 In addition, the expansion of the industry increases the likelihood
that wells will be located in border areas where interstate spillovers might
more easily occur.83 Admittedly, state oil and gas laws are in place in many
instances to address these harms. However, they are uneven, inconsistent,
and not designed to deal with the sheer quantity of activity. Moreover, state
agencies do not necessarily have the personnel available, or the political
will, to enforce the existing state laws and regulations.84 Fracking seems to
have outgrown the oil and gas industry's state regulatory framework.
In addition, the increased activity nationwide may lead to more highly
concentrated well sites in certain locations; these concentrated zones may
result in pollution events that interact with one another to cause a greater
harm than a single event would.85 The accumulation of water withdrawals
from a limited water supply, the aggregation of spills into a given water
body, and the combination of multiple underground injections into poten-
tially seismically unstable rock formations all have the potential to increase
the magnitude of adverse impacts. The concern with this kind of synergistic,
or cumulative, effect has led some to recommend that regulators "should
pay greater attention to the combination of impacts from multiple drilling,
production and delivery activities . . . and make efforts to plan for shale
development impacts on a regional scale."86
Finally, the expansion of fracking has had extensive impacts on rural
communities, raising an issue that potentially touches on issues of national
moral concern.87 Small-town residents across the country have expressed
55 (2012), available at
http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal Society-Content/policy/projects/shae-gas/20 12-
06-28-Shale-gas.pdf (arguing that British regulators need to pay attention to how "risks
[would] scale up if a shale gas industry develops nationwide").
82. See Wiseman, Diseconomies of Scale, supra note 17, at 15 (footnotes omitted).
83. See, e.g., Press Release, Douglas F. Ganser, Md. Attorney Gen., Attorney Gen-
eral Gansler Notifies Chesapeake Energy of the State's Intent to Sue for Endangering the
Health of Citizens and the Environment (May 2, 2011), available at
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2011/050211.html (describing Maryland's intent to file a
suit and seek injunctive relief and civil penalties against an energy company for releasing
thousands of gallons of fracking fluids into a major river).
84. Wiseman, Diseconomies of Scale, supra note 17, at 16-17.
85. Id. at 17-20.
86. See SEAB SHALE GAS PROD. SUBCOMM., NINETY-DAY REPORT 3 (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/081 111 _90_dayreport.pdf.
87. A law student at Columbia Law School offers an elegant depiction of these
impacts:
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worries about fracking's disruption of the historic qualities of their
hometowns.8 In response, many local governments have sought to ban or
impose a moratorium on fracking in their communities.89 In New York,
"dozens of counties and towns ... have imposed moratoriums or bans on
fracking,"' a practice that has thus far been held up against legal chal-
lenges.9' Rural communities in Colorado,92 New Mexico,93 and elsewhere94
[Fracking] dramatically and often irreversibly alters the character of local land-
scapes, regardless of the stringency of state regulations. Forests are fragmented by
roads and rights of way; land is clear-cut and covered over by cement well pads;
the rural ambience is replaced by the drone of compressor stations, drilling and
fracking equipment, and diesel truck engines; and rural sceneries are punctuated by
metal towers rising among forest or farmland. These changes are not merely sub-
jective intrusions: they can impact local economies and the character of local
communities dependent on rural tourism and recreation, uses that are essentially
incompatible with an industrialized landscape.
Andrew Meyer, "Get The Frack out of Town:" Preemption Challenges to Local Fracking
Bans in New York, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. FIELD REP. 6 (2012),
http://www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/articles/get-the-frack-out-of-town-preemption-
challenges-to-local-fracking-bans-in-new-york#_ftn33 (footnote omitted); see also David B.
Spence, Backyard Politics, National Policies: Understanding the Opportunity Costs of Na-
tional Fracking Bans, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 30, 33 (2013),
http://jreg.commons.yale.edu/backyard-politics-national-policies-understanding-the-
opportunity-costs-of-national-fracking-bans/ ("[W]hen a well is being drilled and fracked,
the production area is a hive of truck traffic, power generators, and other activities that can
transform a quiet rural or suburban landscape into an industrial area."); FOOD & WATER
WATCH, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF FRACKING: A PENNSYLVANIA CASE STUDY 5-9 (2013), availa-
ble at http://www.scribd.com/doc/1 70377773/The-Social-Costs-of-Fracking.
88. See, e.g., Associated Press, The Oil Boom Is Destroying Small Towns Across
America, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Mar. 2, 2012, 3:01 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-oil-boom-is-destroying-small-towns-across-america-
2012-3 (describing how violent crime and traffic jams accompanying the boom in fracking
operations have "'turned [a] little town upside down"'); JEFFREY JACQUET, NE. REG'L CTR.
FOR RURAL DEV. & PA. STATE UNIV., ENERGY BOOMTOWNS & NATURAL GAS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR MARCELLUS SHALE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS & RURAL COMMUNITIES 4-27 (2009), availa-
ble at http://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/publications/rdp/rdp43/view (surveying the boomtown liter-
ature and describing boom and bust cycles in the past).
89. See A List of Bans Worldwide, KEEP TAP WATER SAFE,
http:/ikeeptapwatersafe.org/global-bans-on-fracking/ (last updated Jan. 7, 2014).
90. Paul Gallay, Hydrofracking: A Bad Bet for the Environment-and the Economy,
HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Jan. 5, 2012, 3:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-
gallay/fracking-environment b 1186998.html; see also William J. Kemble, Rosendale
Schedules Hearing on Law That Would Ban Fracking in Town, DAILY FREEMAN (Aug. 9,
2012, 7:20 PM),
http://www.dailyfreeman.com/articles/2012/08/09/news/doc5024299153a3b 154598681 .txt
(citing fracking's potential impact on "'small-town character"' as one of several reasons the
Town Board of Rosedale, New York wants to ban the practice).
91. See Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (App. Div.
2013); Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 964 N.Y.S.2d 431 (App. Div.
2013); Weiden Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Klansky, 936 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
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have imposed local bans. In Pennsylvania, the state's attempt to override
local bans was found to be unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.95 Most fracking occurs in rural areas, and the message these local
bans send is clear: the increasing scale of operations and increasing risk of
pollution and community impacts are a widespread concern in rural Ameri-
ca.
96
In summary, then, the advantages of cooperative federalism, the inter-
state nature of and federal interest in drinking-water protection and toxic
pollution prevention, and the scaling up that results from cumulative effects
and widespread rural impacts all support the federalization of fracking regu-
lation. Of course, we are not working with a blank slate; there are existing
federal laws that directly address each of these issues. Parts II and III exam-
ine the federal laws in greater detail, demonstrating that fracking properly
falls under their regimes.
II. FRACK1NG AND THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT: A STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT'S COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM STRUCTURE
AND PURPOSES
Consistent with its general purpose "to assure that water supply sys-
tems serving the public meet minimum national standards for protection of
public health,"97 SDWA mandates regulation of underground injection ac-
tivities in order to protect groundwater resources, including underground
drinking-water supplies." The EPA regulates these activities through its
92. Jack Healy, With Ban on Drilling Practice, Town Lands in Thick of Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.con/2012/l 1/26/us/with-ban-on-fracking-
colorado-town-lands-in-thick-of-dispute.html.
93. Julie Cart, New Mexico County First in Nation to Ban Fracking to Safeguard
Water, L.A. TIMES (May 28, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/28/ocal/la-me-
fracking-ban-20130529.
94. See Ctr. for Energy Econ. & Policy, supra note 7; see also Wiseman, Disecono-
mies of Scale, supra note 17, at 18-20.
95. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
96. A full account of the impact of fracking operations on rural America is far be-
yond the scope of this Article, but the story is a frequently told one, and it has proven sticky.
See, e.g., supra note 5 and accompanying text; Eliza Griswold, The Fracturing of Pennsylva-
nia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/magazine/fracking-
amwell-township.html; Katharine Q. Seelye, Gas Drillers Invade Hunters' Pennsylvania
Paradise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/1 2/us/pennsylvania-hunting-and-fracking-vie-for-state-
lands.html; see also NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 7.
97. Safe Drinking Water Act, 93-523, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. (93 Stat.) 6454.
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (stating that applicants for
underground injection permits "must satisfy the State that the underground injection will not
endanger drinking water sources").
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Underground Injection Control (UIC) permit program.99 Under the UIC-
permitting process, the EPA and states that have primacy pursuant to
SDWA's cooperative federalism regime regulate the permitting, siting, con-
struction, operation, monitoring, and closure of underground injection
wells.00 As a general matter, oil and gas injection wells-including so-
called "enhanced recovery" wells like fracking wells-are regulated under
the UIC program's Class II requirements.' However, in the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 (EPAct), °2 Congress amended the definition of "underground
injection" under SDWA to specifically exclude "the underground injection
of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels)" associated with frack-
ing."'3 As a result, fracking operations may now inject anything other than
diesel without first obtaining a UIC permit." 4 This exemption has contribut-
ed to the substantial controversy surrounding and public opposition to frack-
ing. Nonetheless, subsequent legislative efforts to repeal the amendment to
the definition have thus far failed to advance beyond committee."'5
The amended statute could, in theory, provide proponents of state reg-
ulation with some evidence that Congress has reconsidered the federalism
question presented by drinking-water protection and reached a rational con-
clusion that fracking's impacts are best left managed by the states. Howev-
er, a thorough examination of the statute and legislative history of SDWA
demonstrates not only that the Act represents a long-considered and clearly
articulated federalism choice regarding protection of the nation's drinking-
water supplies, but also that the Act contemplates regulating oil and gas
exploration and production that might adversely impact drinking-water sup-
plies. By contrast, the 2005 amendment offers no explanation whatsoever
for its revision of the existing federalism choice or for its removal of frack-
ing from SDWA's cooperative federalism regime.
99. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.11 (2011) ("Any underground injection, except into a well
authorized by rule or except as authorized by permit issued under the UIC program, is pro-
hibited.").
100. See id. § 144.1; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR STATE SUBMISSIONS
UNDER SECTION 1425 OF THE SAFE WATER DRINKING ACT: GROUND WATER PROGRAM
GUIDANCE #19, at 13-17 (last visited Jan. 22, 2014), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/guidance/guide-uicguidance- I 9_primacy_app.pdf.
101. See4OC.F.R. § 144.6(b)(2).
102. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d).
104. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERMITrING GUIDANCE FOR OIL AND GAS
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ACTIVITIES USING DIESEL FUELS-DRAFT: UNDERGROUND
INJECTION CONTROL PROGRAM GUIDANCE #84, at 6 (2012), available at
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hfdieselfuelsgui
dance508.pdf.
105. See infra text accompanying note 257 (discussing the Fracturing Responsibility
and Awareness of Chemicals Act).
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A. The Need for a Federal Role in Drinking-Water Protection
Although the earliest federal efforts to regulate drinking-water safety
date back to the turn of the twentieth century, when Congress established
the Public Health Service Hygienic Laboratory to study water-borne illness-
es, most public drinking-water supplies did not have to meet federal safety
standards until 1974, when SDWA was enacted. °6 There was also no na-
tional program for underground injection control prior to that point.
Spurred by a number of highly visible instances of water-borne illness
and drinking-water contamination-including the 1968 incident at the
Hammermill Paper Company in Erie, Pennsylvania, where over-
pressurization of a geological formation caused by an injection well was
reported to have resulted in groundwater contamination about five miles
from the well site--Congress began in 1970 to consider a national drinking-
water protection program.'0 7 Several published reports also proved influen-
tial. In 1970, the Bureau of Water Hygiene of the Public Health Service
issued the Community Water Supply Study, which documented deteriorat-
ing water quality, increasing incidents of waterborne disease, and serious
questions regarding the efficacy of then-existing treatment plant technolo-
gy' 08 Subsequent studies issued by the EPA and the Environmental Defense
Fund in 1974, linking carcinogens to pollutants found in drinking water,
lifted the legislation over two final hurdles: (1) the National Governors'
Conference, which objected to federal regulation of water safety; and (2) the
oil and gas industry, which lobbied hard against the underground injection
control provisions of the proposed legislation.'09
Federalism issues were at the heart of the early Congressional debates
and lobbying activity. Ultimately, Congress perceived a need for federal
intervention in drinking-water protection for a number of reasons. On a pro-
grammatic level, Congress perceived a misplaced and ill-founded public
confidence in public drinking-water supply quality; pervasive infrastructure
deficiencies, including inadequate protections for groundwater; inadequate-
106. For a concise general history of SDWA and its various provisions, and a close
reading of the extensive legislative history, see generally Thomas J. Douglas, Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1974-History and Critique, 5 ENVTL. AFF. 501 (1976). For histories specific to
safe drinking water standards, see Steinzor, supra note 10, at 187-99; Charles D. Larson,
Historical Development of the National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, in SAFE
DRINKING WATER ACT: AMENDMENTS, REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS 3-14 (Edward J. Cala-
brese, Charles E. Gilbert & Harris Pastides eds., 1989).
107. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL PROGRAM OVERVIEW: UNDERGROUND
INJECTION CONTROL REGULATIONS 3 (2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/uic techovrview.pdf.
108. BUREAU OF WATER HYGIENE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
COMMUNITY WATER SUPPLY STUDY: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS, at i-xii
(1970); see Douglas, supra note 106, at 506-08.
109. Douglas, supra note 106, at 517-18.
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ly trained plant operators; and a general lack of monitoring and enforce-
ment." 0 More broadly, Congress was of the view that "the national economy
may be expected to be harmed by unhealthy drinking water and the illnesses
which may result therefrom.""' Harms to the national economy were
thought likely to coincide with the predicted impacts of waterbome disease
on tourism, travel, worker productivity, and agricultural worker mobility."2
Accordingly, Congress surmised, "[T]he unavailability of a reliably safe
drinking water supply may well be a primary limiting factor in the econom-
ic growth of a town or region and ultimately in the growth of the Nation's
economy.""' 3 In addition, Congress concluded that federal action was ap-
propriate because the source of contaminants that endanger the public health
are "frequently ... business[es] engaged in or enterprises affecting inter-
state commerce"; because underground drinking-water supplies cross state
lines; because drinking-water-related disease could prove a drain on
healthcare financing; and because it was "abundantly clear that additional
Federal assistance, research, and support is necessary in order to enable
State and local efforts to provide safe water to be successful."" 4
The legislative history of the Act and its later amendments also illu-
minates that Congress has, from the outset, responded to what was per-
ceived to be a national moral imperative to provide sanitary drinking water
and to protect existing and potential future drinking-water supplies.' As
noted by President Gerald Ford in the signing statement accompanying the
1974 Act:
Nothing is more essential to the life of every single American than clean air,
pure food, and safe drinking water. There have been strong national programs to
improve the quality of our air and the purity of our food. This bill will provide us
with the protection we need for drinking water. "
6
110. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, at 4-8(1974), reprinted in I ENV'T & NATURAL RES.
POLICY Div., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SAFE DRINKING
WATER ACT TOGETHER WITH A SECTION-BY-SECTION INDEX 533, 536-40 (Comm. Print 1982)
[hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. I]; S. REP. No. 93-231, at 3-4 (1973), reprinted in
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. 1, supra, at 793, 797-98.
111. H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, at 4, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. 1, supra
note 110, at 540.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 540-41; see also Douglas, supra note 106, at 508-17 (providing further
discussion of congressional deliberations on the federalism question).
115. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. 1, supra
note 110, at 533; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 107, at 4 ("Due to dispar-
ate levels of protection afforded ground water under the State injection well programs at the
time, Congress passed the SDWA of 1974 ... requiring EPA to establish a Federal-State
system of regulation of injection activities.").
116. The President's Statement on Signing the Safe Drinking Water Act (Dec. 17,
1974), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. I, supra note 110, at 398.
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The Senate Commerce Committee Report voiced a similar concern: "No
need is more basic for all human beings than a dependable, disease-free
supply of drinking water. The supply of adequate amounts of high quality
drinking water has become a service that is not only hoped for but ex-
pected."" 7 Subsequent Congresses have reiterated the national moral imper-
ative justifying the federal role in drinking-water protection, announcing at
different times that "the Safe Drinking Water Act stands at the center of the
national effort to protect the public health from dangerous chemicals";" 8
that SDWA "was enacted in 1974 in order to assure that all citizens served
by public water systems would be provided high quality water supplies";" 9
and that it "has become an essential component of the Federal laws passed
by Congress to protect public health."'20
Although drinking-water protection programs have undoubtedly im-
proved as a result of forty years of SDWA implementation, the fundamental
premises behind Congress's decision to create a federal-state partnership to
protect drinking-water supplies are as applicable today as they were in
1974. Drinking water has the same relationship to the national economy,
and it remains a vital national moral imperative to provide safe drinking
water and to protect potential future drinking-water supplies.
B. The Plain Meaning of "Underground Injection" Includes Oil and Gas
Production Activities-Such as Fracking
Protection of groundwater is a vital component of SDWA and a neces-
sary part of any program with the goal of protecting the nation's drinking-
water supplies. According to the EPA, approximately 142,400 of the na-
tion's 156,600 public water systems, or about 91%, rely on groundwater;
approximately 40,000 of the nation's 51,700 community water systems, or
about 77%, do so.12' The UIC permit program provisions were included "in
recognition of the fact that the best means of assuring present and future
117. S. REP. No. 93-231, at 2 (1973), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. I,
supra note 10, at 793, 796.
118. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1034, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 2 ENV'T &NATURAL RES.
POLICY Div., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SAFE DRINKING
WATER ACT AMENDMENTS 1983-1992, TOGETHER WITH A SECTION-BY-SECTION INDEX 735,
749 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. II].
119. S. REP. No. 99-56, at 1 (1985), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. II,
supra note 118, at 305.
120. H.R. REP. No. 99-168, at 16 (1985), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL.
I1, supra note 118, at 511,526.
121. See MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31243, SAFE DRINKING WATER
ACT (SDWA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 8 n.2 (2010).
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supplies of safe drinking water is to protect the sources from contamina-
tion." 22
Prior to the 2005 EPAct amendment to SDWA, fracking squarely fit
into the definition of "underground injection" and therefore required a per-
mit pursuant to the UIC program. Accordingly, when the EPA declared in
the early 1990s that hydraulic fracturing was a "well stimulation technique
associated with production" and was not subject to control under the UIC
program, 123 the Eleventh Circuit found the EPA's definition inconsistent
with the plain language of SDWA.'24 The court held that all "underground
injection" activities, including fracking, must be regulated under the stat-
ute.125 Several years later, the Eleventh Circuit overruled a subsequent at-
tempt by the EPA to apply a lesser regulatory standard to fracking.126 In that
case, the court found that the EPA's determination that fracking did not
require Class II permits but could, instead, be issued a unique permit for
"'Class II-like underground injection activit[ies]' was inconsistent with the
plain language of the agency's own regulations.127 The relevant EPA regula-
tion defines a Class II well as one that injects fluids "[f]or enhanced recov-
ery of oil or natural gas."'28 The legislative history also supports the conclu-
sion that Congress intended both that the terms of the Act be broadly con-
strued and that they be applied to oil and gas production activities like
fracking. For example, in the House Report, the Energy and Natural Re-
sources Committee stated its intention that the definition of "underground
injection activities" is to be "liberally construed so as to effectuate the pre-
ventative and public health protective purposes of the bill. The Committee
seeks to protect not only currently-used sources of drinking water, but also
potential drinking water sources for the future."'29 The Committee was also
122. See S. REP. No. 98-641, at 2 (1984), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL.
II, supra note 118, at 893, 894.
123. Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells hydrowhat.cfm
(last updated May 9, 2012).
124. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. EPA (LEAF 1), 118 F.3d 1467, 1475 (11 th
Cir. 1997).
125. Id.
126. See Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. EPA (LEAF If), 276 F.3d 1253, 1264
(11 th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 1263-64.
128. 40 C.F.R. § 144.6 (2013). The agency at that time defined hydraulic fracturing
as "a temporary and intermittent process in which fluids are injected underground at high
pressures to create fractures in the coals seam that enhance the recovery of methane gas by
creating pathways for the gas to flow to the surface." 65 Fed. Reg. 2889, 2892 (Jan. 19,
2000).
129. H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, at 32 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454,
6484; see also H.R. REP. No. 98-1034, at 27 (1984), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
VOL. 11, supra note 118, at 735, 761 ("Under the 1974 Act, EPA was required to establish
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concerned that its definition of "endangering drinking water sources" be
construed liberally:
Injection which causes or increases contamination of such sources may fall within
this definition even if the amount of contaminant which may enter the water source
would not by itself cause the maximum allowable levels to be exceeded. The defi-
nition would be met if injected material were not completely contained within the
well, if it may enter either a present or potential drinking water source, and if it (or
some form into which it might be converted) may pose a threat to human health or
render the water source unfit for human consumption.
1 30
Moreover, Congress expressly considered the role of oil and gas pro-
duction activities and decided that those operations would fall under the
ambit of the UIC permit program. For instance, in discussing the ways in
which the underground injection of contaminants had become a national
problem, the Committee noted that "[e]nergy production companies are
using injection techniques to increase production"'' and that "[t]he defini-
tion of 'underground injection' is intended to be broad enough to cover any
contaminant which may be put below ground level and which flows or
moves, whether the contaminant is in semi-solid, liquid, sludge, or any other
form or state."' 32 Importantly, and in direct contrast to arguments advanced
by those who believe the original SDWA was not intended to cover frack-
ing, "[t]his definition is not limited to the injection of wastes or to injection
for disposal purposes; it is intended also to cover, among other contami-
nants, the injection of brines and the injection of contaminants for extraction
or other purposes."'33
In crafting the UIC permit program provisions, Congress also rejected
an amendment that would have included an exclusion analogous to that con-
tained in § 502(6) of the CWA.'34 That provision excludes from the defini-
tion of "pollutant" all
water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of
oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or gas production and disposed
of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes
is approved by authority of the State in which the well is located, and if such State
determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the degradation of
ground or surface water resources.' 
35
minimum requirements for State programs controlling underground injection. (Underground
injection is the process of forcing liquids underground through a well). Improperly done,
underground injection can contaminate drinking water supplies.").
130. H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, at 32 (1974), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL.
I, supra note 110, at 533, 564.
131. Id. at561.
132. Id. at 563.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006 & Supp.
2012).
1509
Michigan State Law Review
Instead, the Committee adopted an amendment including a provision
that UIC permit program requirements not unnecessarily "interfere with or
impede" oil and gas production.'36 This decision expressed the Committee's
intent "not to authorize needless interference with oil or gas production.'
' 37
Regulations of oil and gas production under SDWA, then, would be limited
to situations in which they were "essential to assure that underground
sources of drinking water will not be endangered" by oil and gas explora-
tion and production (E&P) activity.' This limitation was not meant to
handcuff the EPA's ability to regulate oil and gas production but to "assure
that constraints on energy production activities would be kept as limited in
scope as possible while still assuring the safety of present and potential
sources of drinking water."'' 39 The "essential" slate of regulations were to
include pre-injection tests; geological and hydrological tests; pre-treatment
measures; "best available techniques for design, siting, construction, opera-
tion, maintenance, and abandonment"; and monitoring.'40
Some argue that the plain language of SDWA does not indicate an in-
tent to place fracking under the statute's cooperative federalism regime be-
cause, the argument goes, in referring to "enhanced recovery" Congress
meant to use the phrase as "a term of art that refers to particular types of
[recovery] operations."' 4 ' This view, however, directly contradicts the
EPA's current interpretation, which is that "hydraulic fracturing [is] another
enhanced recovery process." '42 What's more, it is even inconsistent with the
EPAct, which does not exempt fracking with diesel fuels from SDWA.1"' If
fracking with diesel fuels is enhanced recovery, then fracking with other
chemicals that accomplish the same thing must be enhanced recovery, as
well.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2012).
137. H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, at 31, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. 1, supra
note 110, at 533, 563.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 561; see also Policy on Subsurface Emplacement of Fluids by Well Injec-
tion; Administrator's Decision, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,922, 12,922 (Apr. 9, 1974).
141. See, e.g., Keith B. Hall, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Under the Safe
Drinking WaterAct, 19 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 22 (2011).
142. Class II Wells-Oil and Gas Related Injection Wells (Class I1), U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2 (last updated May 9,
2012).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(l)(B)(ii) (2006 & Supp. 2012).
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C. The Statutory Structure of the UIC Permit Program and the Oil and Gas
Production Provisions
The statutory structure of the UIC permit program provides for a fairly
typical cooperative federalism regime: it is designed to establish minimum
standards to protect against a particular environmental impact-the contam-
ination of the nation's underground drinking-water supplies. Accordingly,
the statute directed the EPA to publish a list of states that would require a
UIC program "to assure that underground injection [would] not endanger
drinking water sources."'" The EPA has included all fifty states on this
list.1 45 The statute also required the EPA to promulgate regulations govern-
ing state UIC programs to ensure that the state programs would satisfy the
statutory mandate to prevent endangerment. 46 To be approved by the EPA,
a state control program has to meet certain statutory standards: (a) it must
prevent underground injection unless authorized by permit or rule; (b) it
may authorize underground injection only where it is demonstrated that the
injection will not endanger drinking-water sources; and (c) it must "include
inspection, monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements.' '
47
Where a state fails to comply with the statute or its regulations-whether by
submitting an inadequate program or none at all-the EPA is required to
design, implement, and enforce a regulatory program for that state. 148
SDWA includes several provisions designed to avoid disrupting oil
and gas production. Importantly here, the EPA's regulations may not "inter-
fere with or impede" the production or recovery of oil or natural gas unless
the interference or impediment is essential to assure that underground injec-
tion will not endanger underground sources of drinking water. 49 This means
that neither the EPA nor the states can regulate fracking pursuant to SDWA
in such a way as to "stop or substantially delay" oil and gas production un-
less the practice endangers drinking-water supplies.' If the production ac-
tivity does endanger drinking-water supplies, then the statute clearly con-
templates regulation under the cooperative federalism regime. However, if
regulation would "stop or substantially delay" oil and gas production and
the activity does not endanger drinking-water supplies, then the statute ap-
144. Id. § 300h-l(a).
145. 40 C.F.R. § 144.1(e) (2013).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(a)(l), (b)(1).
147. Id. § 300h(b)(1)(A)-(C).
148. See id. § 300h-l(c).
149. Id. § 300h(b)(2).
150. H. R. REP. No. 93-1185, at 31 (1974), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL.
1, supra note 10, at 533, 563. According to the House Report, the "test" of essentiality
would only be relevant upon a demonstration that a requirement would "stop or substantially
delay" such production. Id.
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parently does not apply. This was true even before passage of the 2005
EPAct amendment.
In addition, two other statutory provisions bear directly on fracking's
federalism-choice analysis. First, the EPA's regulations must reflect varia-
tions in "geologic, hydrological, or historical conditions" between the
states. 5 ' Thus, the "local tailoring to environmental conditions" argument
offered by political proponents of state regulation of fracking and by schol-
ars taking a more theoretical approach is anticipated by the statute and in-
corporated into its text. Second, to the extent feasible, the EPA may not
promulgate rules that "unnecessarily disrupt" state UIC programs that were
earlier in effect.'52 Thus, where states have existing programs that satisfy the
endangerment standard, the law provides for their continuation.'53 Again,
arguments raised by political and scholarly proponents of state regulation-
including the benefits provided by regulatory diversity and state experimen-
tation, the desire for local tailoring to political preferences and risk toler-
ances, and respect for state decision-making processes and the participation
they garner-are all addressed by these provisions of the federal statute.
Nonetheless, the goal of protecting underground drinking-water sup-
plies remains paramount. According to the statute, none of the provisions
discussed above "shall be construed to alter or affect the duty to assure that
underground sources of drinking water will not be endangered by any un-
derground injection."' 54 This commitment to non-endangerment reflects the
statute's precautionary purpose.'55 The precautionary purpose has, in turn,
been recognized by the courts, which have repeatedly rejected the notion
that the UIC permit requirements are directed only to certain forms of un-
derground injection rather than toward the general purpose of protecting
underground drinking-water supplies:
Unusable ground water is unusable ground water no matter whether the original
source of the pollution arrived in a loose, free form manner, or in containers inject-
ed into the ground. We find no language in the SDWA showing that Congress
meant to regulate only certain forms of underground pollution, while overlooking
other forms of contamination of ground water via underground injection.'
56
151. § 300h(b)(3)(A).
152. Id. § 300h(b)(3)(B).
153. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history
of the 1980 amendments).
154. § 300h(b)(3)(C).
155. Id. § 300h(d)(2) ("Underground injection endangers drinking water sources if
such injection may result in the presence in underground water which supplies or can reason-
ably be expected to supply any public water system of any contaminant, and if the presence
of such contaminant may result in such system's not complying with any national primary
drinking water regulation or may otherwise adversely affect the health of persons.").
156. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258, 1271 (1 st Cir. 1987); see
also supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (discussing LEAF I and LEAF H lawsuits).
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Thus, the plain meaning of the statute, and its purposes and structure,
demonstrates that the UIC permit program requirements were intended to
cover all underground injection activities that endanger drinking-water sup-
plies; although accommodations are made for the oil and gas industry, the
statute is not to be applied categorically on an industry-by-industry or prac-
tice-by-practice basis. Moreover, the plain meaning and statutory purposes
and structure provide ample support for the federalization of fracking regu-
lation and exhibit the well-grounded federalism choices made by Congress
in allocating shared power to the federal government and the states in this
area. A closer examination of the legislative history further supports this
reading of the statute.
D. Legislative History and SDWA's Federalism Choice
As mentioned above, the legislative history of SDWA and its various
amendments demonstrates that the scope of coverage under the Act was
intended to be broad in order to respond appropriately to what was recog-
nized to be a national problem with drinking-water security. The legislative
history also shows that Congress has consistently and explicitly addressed
the federalism questions arising from federal intervention in setting water
quality standards and mandating UIC permit programs that meet minimum
national standards. This history provides further support for regulating
fracking's potential impacts on underground drinking-water supplies under
SDWA's UIC permit program.
In the signing statement accompanying the 1974 passage of SDWA,
President Ford noted that the division of powers between the federal gov-
ernment and the states had been a contested issue: "During the extensive
consideration of this legislation, spokemen [sic] for the Administration op-
posed extensive Federal involvement in what has traditionally been State
and local regulatory matters and unnecessary costs to the Federal Govern-
ment."' 57 The House and Senate committees charged with putting together
the bill both shared President Ford's concern. However, the House Commit-
tee noted that although it "views the problem of unsafe drinking water as a
matter which is and should be primarily the concern of State and local gov-
ernments, the Committee has determined that the Federal government also
has a responsibility to ensure the safety of the water its citizens drink."' 58
Two factors were particularly influential in this determination: first, the fact
that "the causes and effects of unhealthy drinking water are not confined
within the borders of State or local jurisdictions"; and second, the fact that
157. The President's Statement on Signing the Safe Drinking Water Act (Dec. 17,
1974), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. 1, supra note 110, at 398.
158. H.R. REp. No. 93-1185, at 8 (1974), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. 1,
supra note 110, at 533, 540.
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"the solution to the problem ... must be found in a cooperative effort in
which the Federal government assists, reinforces, and sets standards for the
State and local efforts."' 59 The Senate Committee was of a similar view,
noting that "prime responsibility for maintaining the quality of drinking
water will remain with State and local government, but the Federal Gov-
ernment will exercise a new responsibility to set standards and provide as-
sistance in order to protect public water supplies from contamination."' 6 °
The underground injection control program has been a central, if con-
troversial, component of the federalism question from the beginning.'6' In-
deed, the express purpose of the Act was not only to authorize the EPA "to
establish Federal standards for protection from all harmful contaminants,
which standards would be applicable to all public water systems" but also to
"establish a joint Federal-State system for . . . protecting underground
sources of drinking water."'' 2 Notably, the concern over underground injec-
tion was just as vital ten years later, when a proposal for what would be-
come the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986 was under consid-
eration: "[I]t has become increasingly apparent that the quality of our Na-
tion's drinking water sources.., supplied by underground aquifers is one of
the most urgent environmental and health problems facing us today."'
' 63
That the 1974 House Committee was conscious of underground injec-
tion for oil and gas extraction purposes-and not just for disposal purpos-
es-is, as discussed earlier, evident."6 The industry's concerns with regula-
tion in this area continued to factor into the development of the statute, be-
ginning with the Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977.165 The primary
purpose of the 1977 amendments was to give more assistance to states and
allow them more time to come into compliance with the Act. 6  In the course
of the enactment of those amendments, the oil and gas industry raised a
number of concerns over the obligations imposed by the UIC program. In
response to these "forcefully expressed concerns," the House Committee
reiterated that a federal response was warranted and that local tailoring had
been built into the Act:
159. Id.
160. S. REP. No. 93-23 1, at 1 (1973), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. 1,
supra note 110, at 795.
161. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the oil and gas industry's
lobbying efforts).
162. H.R. REP. No. 93-1185 (1974), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. I,
supra note 110, at 533.
163. 130 CONG. REC. 20,346 (1984) (statement of Rep. Eckart).
164. See supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text (discussing oil and gas provi-
sions in plain meaning section).
165. Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1393.
166. H.R. REP. No. 95-338 (1977), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. 1,
supra note 10, at 268.
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The Committee believes that national underground injection control guidelines are
essential for the protection of [the] public health and for the prevention of [the]
contamination of present and potential future underground sources of drinking wa-
ter....
On the other hand, the Committee recognizes the existence of varying geolog-
ical, hydrological, and historic condtions [sic] in different States and in different
areas within a State. The committee intends the Administrator's national guidelines
would be sufficiently flexible to permit States to take account of these varying
conditions in their undeground [sic] injection control programs. These varying
conditions should be considered for the purpose of assuring protection of under-
ground water sources, while preventing unnecessary interference with oil and gas
production.
This authority for reasonable flexibility should not be construed to undermine
or reduce the State's duty to assure protection of underground water sources. It
means, for example, that detailed technical and procedural specifications of the
guidelines may be relaxed or modified if the State shows that under special local
conditions such specifications are not necessary to protect underground water re-
sources. 1
67
In addition, the Committee noted that concerns had been raised with
the EPA regarding the "alleged adverse effect" the guidelines could have on
oil and gas production; though it took no position on the validity of the con-
cerns, the committee urged the EPA "to exercise due care [with regard to]
striking [a] proper balance in its guidelines with respect to stripper well
production."'68 At the same time, the Committee cautioned that its words
should not "be construed as requiring the Administrator to subordinate the
concern for protection of underground water sources to that of energy pro-
duction .... [I]t remains a critical task to conserve and safeguard our Na-
tion's present and future supplies of drinking water."'69
The 1980 amendments offer further evidence of how legitimate feder-
alism concerns have consistently factored into SDWA. The 1980 amend-
ments created § 1425, which provides an alternative method for EPA ap-
proval of the state UIC permit program for oil and gas related activities.' 0
167. Id. at 278.
168. Id. The EPA obviously took the Committee's caution to heart. See OFFICE OF
DRINKING WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL UIC PROGRAM DOCKET CONTROL,
STATEMENT OF BASIS AND PURPOSE: UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL REGULATIONS
(1980), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/rept uic statemt basispurpose uic 1980.pdf (noting
that final UIC permit program regulations differed from earlier proposals "in that they fur-
nish a greater degree of flexibility to State Directors in regulating well injection" and that the
EPA made this adjustment because "it became more fully aware of [the] various well injec-
tion practices, the characteristics of substrata into which fluids are injected, and the range of
methods by which well injection is accomplished").
169. H.R. REP. No. 95-338, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. 1, supra note
110, at 279.
170. Safe Water Drinking Act Amendment of Dec. 5, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-502, §
1425, 94 Stat. 2737, 2737-38.
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The provision was created because, as the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce noted:
Most of the 32 states that regulate underground injection related to the recov-
ery or production of oil or natural gas (or both) believe they have programs already
in place that meet the minimum requirements of the Act including the prevention
of underground injection which endangers drinking water sources. This is especial-
ly true of the major producing states where underground injection control programs
have been underway for years.171
n recognition of this fact, the Committee expressed its "intent that states
should be able to continue these programs unencumbered with additional
Federal requirements if they demonstrate that they meet the requirements of
the Act.'
'7
The legislative history affirms that the available pro-decentralization
rationales for underground injection are built into the cooperative federalism
regime established under SDWA. Moreover, the particular concerns ex-
pressed by the oil and gas industry have also been accommodated by the
dual federal-state governance structure.' Accordingly, there appears to be
greater support for the federalization of fracking regulation than for decen-
tralization.
171. H.R. REP. No. 96-1348 (1980), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VOL. I,
supra note 110, at 63.
172. Id.; see also OFFICE OF DRINKING WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
NATIONAL UIC PROGRAM DOCKET CONTROL, STATEMENT OF BASIS AND PURPOSE:
UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL REGULATIONS (1979), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/reptuic statemt basispurpose uic 1979.pdf ("The
Director need not require additional casing and cementing for Class II injection wells located
in existing injection fields if: (1) the state in which the well is located has had applicable
regulatory controls in effect prior to the introduction of the federal program; (2) the Director
imposes those pre-existing controls; and (3) well injection under these circumstances will not
create any significant risk to the health of persons using the water for drinking purposes.").
173. The EPA's regulations further implement the statute's purposes and cooperative
federalism structure. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 144.1 (2013) (establishing minimum requirements
for state UIC permit programs); id. § 145.1 l(b)(1) (stating that state regulations must estab-
lish requirements "at least as stringent" as federal regulations, but also "may impose more
stringent requirements"); id. § 145.31(d) (mandating approval of state programs that conform
to applicable requirements); id. § 144.1(g) (prohibiting injections that result "in the move-
ment of fluid containing any contaminant into underground sources of drinking water ... if
the presence of that contaminant may cause a violation of any primary drinking water regula-
tion ... or may adversely affect the health of persons"); id. §§ 146.6, .8 (requiring study of
geological formations to address migration of pollutants through strata of rock); id. §§
146.13(a)(l), .23(a)(1), .33(a)(1) (requiring well injection pressure to be controlled to prevent
opening fractures in the confining strata or otherwise causing the rise of fluids into an overly-
ing protected zone).
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E. Federalism Choice and the 2005 Amendment
One might challenge the argument that the language, purposes, struc-
ture, and legislative history of SDWA substantiate a theoretical pro-
federalization argument by pointing to the 2005 EPAct amendment, which
defined fracking without diesel fuel out of the statute. This challenge might
well succeed if the language, purposes, structure, or legislative history of
the amendment offer evidence that support state regulation over and against
the well-considered rationales offered in support of federal regulation.
However, there is no evidence that federalism concerns played any role in
the amendment.
Regarding plain meaning, the language of the 2005 EPAct and what is
now § 1421(d)(1) of SDWA-the definitional exclusion of fracking from
"underground injection activities"-is clear enough; however, it is also left
entirely unexplained. Moreover, the continuing inclusion of fracking with
diesel fuel within the definition of "underground injection activities" is
problematic for the decentralization argument. The injection of fracking
fluids with diesel fuel occurs in the same way as the injection of fracking
fluids without it; the "underground injection" is identical, though the con-
tent of the fluids is not. The distinction, then, cannot relate to the aspects of
fracking that fall under federal regulation-well siting, construction, opera-
tion, maintenance, reporting, and closure-but to a greater perceived risk
posed by fracking with diesel fuels.174
Two problems are immediately apparent here. First, as described
above, actual endangerment of drinking-water supplies is a necessary crite-
rion for SDWA to apply at all. If fracking without diesel fuels does not en-
danger water supplies, then the statute does not apply.'75 There is no need to
specifically exempt the practice. In any event, defiming one type of practice
174. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS
TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED
METHANE RESERVOIRS, at ES-I to -2, -16 to -17 (2004), available at
http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/PIO0A99N.PDF (noting that diesel fuels contain BTEX
compounds, which are regulated under SDWA, and that the agency had entered into a Mem-
orandum of Agreement with three major hydraulic fracturing companies to voluntarily sus-
pend use of diesel fuel); see also Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, House of Representatives, 112th Cong., Edward J. Markey, Rank-
ing Member, Comm. on Natural Res., House of Representatives, 112th Cong. & Diana De-
Gette, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, House of Representa-
tives, 112th Cong., to Lisa Jackson, Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 31, 2011), availa-
ble at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Jackson-
Diesel-Hydraulic-Fracturing-2011-1-31.pdf (noting the committee finding that fracking
companies, including signatories to the Memorandum of Agreement, had injected 32.2 mil-
lion gallons of diesel fuel or fracking fluids including diesel fuel in nineteen states between
2005 and 2009).
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2012).
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as underground injection and another identical practice as not cannot have
anything to do with federalism concerns. Second, according to the statute, if
fracking fluids contain toxic chemicals that share the characteristics of die-
sel fuel, they are nonetheless excluded from the statute.'76 This "distinction
without a difference" fails to correlate with arguments pertaining to local
tailoring, "laboratories" of democracy, the matching principle, or any other
component of federalism analysis.
The history of the 2005 amendment does not help the decentralization
argument's theoretical cause. In 1999, the EPA initiated a study of potential
impacts of coalbed methane well fracking on drinking-water supplies.'77
When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, with the study still
ongoing, he assigned Vice President Dick Cheney, former CEO of Hallibur-
ton, "'78 to lead the National Energy Policy Development Group (Energy Task
Force), which was charged with developing a new national energy policy. 7 9
Records indicate that energy industry representatives had grossly dispropor-
tionate access to Vice President Cheney during the formulation of the na-
tional policy."' The Energy Task Force eventually recommended that the
President "promote enhanced oil and gas recovery from existing wells
through new technology." 181
The EPA issued its study in 2004, concluding "the injection of hydrau-
lic fracturing fluids into [coalbed methane] wells poses little or no threat to
underwater sources of drinking water (USDW) and does not justify addi-
176. In its 2004 Report, the EPA explained that it was especially concerned with
diesel fuel and its BTEX compound constituents because it did not "believe" that other
chemicals present in fracturing fluids were being introduced "in concentrations high enough
to pose a significant threat" to underground drinking water supplies. U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, supra note 174, at 4-17. The agency also concluded that "the same hydrodynamic
phenomena" that would reduce the risk of contamination from diesel fuel would control the
movement of non-diesel fuel chemicals. Id. Ultimately, the EPA's conclusions regarding the
content of fracking fluids were based solely on "conversations with field engineers and on
witnessing three separate fracturing events." Id.
177. See id. at ES-1. The study did not examine drinking water impacts of fracking in
tight sands or shale formations. Id.
178. Though Halliburton did not invent fracking, the company was the first to patent
and commercially market the technique. See Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, NSI
Techs., Hydraulic Fracturing: History of an Enduring Technology, J. PETROLEUM TECH.,
Dec. 2010, at 26, 27, available at
http://www.spe.org/jpt/pfint/archives/2010/12/I0Hydraulic.pdf. Halliburton is also one of the
three largest fracking companies in the United States. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra
note 174, at 7.
179. NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GRP., RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE, AND
ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, at viii (2001).
180. Michael Abramowitz & Steven Mufson, Papers Detail Industry's Role in Chen-
ey's Energy Report, WASH. POST, July 18, 2007, at Al.
181. NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GRP., supra note 179, at 5-20.
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tional study at this time."'82 The report did not recommend that Congress or
the agency enact a categorical exemption for fracking, nor was it the EPA's
position that an exemption was even appropriate.'83 Moreover, the study
itself has been subject to scrutiny. An agency whistleblower claimed that
the EPA's conclusion that fracking "pose[d] little or no threat" was com-
pletely unsupportable' and that the study was flawed because the agency
"conducted limited research" and because five of the seven members on the
Peer Review Panel had conflicts of interest.' Representative Henry Wax-
man (D-CA) requested that the EPA Inspector General examine whether
political influence had an improper role in the study,'86 but before any action
could be taken, Congress passed the EPAct, and SDWA exemption became
law.1
8 7
The problems with the 2004 study were not limited to the insinuations
of bad science and political tampering. The report was also facially incon-
sistent with a 1987 EPA report that concluded that fracking in a natural gas
well in West Virginia had contaminated an underground drinking-water
source.'88 The 1987 report also noted that the instance was intended to be
"fairly illustrative" of a broader pollution problem associated with hydraulic
fracturing.'89 The 1987 report was not mentioned in the EPA's 2004 study,
and there is no evidence that Congress reviewed the report during its con-
sideration of the 2005 amendment. Notably, although it remains a hotly
182. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 174, at ES-1; see also supra note 174
and accompanying text (discussing diesel fuel migration).
183. Abrahm Lustgarten, Former Bush EPA Official Says Fracking Exemption Went
Too Far; Congress Should Revisit, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://www.propublica.org/article/former-bush-epa-official-says-fracking-exemption-went-
too-far.
184. Letter from Weston Wilson, Envtl. Eng'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Wayne
Allard, Colo. Senator, 108th Cong., Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Colo. Senator, 108th Cong. &
Diana DeGette, Colo. Representative, 108th Cong. (Oct. 8, 2004), available at
http://latimes.image2.trb.comi/lanews/media/acrobat/2004-10/14647025.pdf.
185. Id.
186. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, Comm. on Gov't
Reform, House of Representatives, 108th Cong., to Nikki L. Tinsley, Inspector Gen., U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency (Oct. 14, 2004), available at
http://waxman.house.gov/sites/waxman.house.gov/files/Letter to EPA IG.pdf.
187. See generally Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 17, at 116, 170-79 (provid-
ing a more detailed account of these events).
188. 1 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA/530-SW-88-003, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANAGEMENT OF WASTES FROM THE
EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND
GEOTHERMAL ENERGY, at V-22 (1987), available at
http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=20012D4P.pdf.
189. See id. at lV- 11; see also Ian Urbina, A Tainted Water Well, and Concern There
May Be More, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2011, at A13 (offering detailed background information
on the 1987 report).
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debated subject, the EPA's most recent research found that fracking can
contaminate underground drinking water. 90
In addition, there is no other evidence from the legislative history that
Congress considered whether states or the federal government should regu-
late fracking during the lead up to the 2005 amendment. The official Com-
mittee Reports entirely avoid the issue.' 9' What's more, the legislative histo-
ry actually reveals that the decision to seek the exemption was made prior to
the EPA's 2004 report. 92 In short, then, SDWA exemption appears to be
essentially disconnected from any argument that could be, or was, made in
favor of state regulation of fracking.
At the end of the day-regardless of the acknowledged need for a fed-
eral role in drinking-water protection, the plain meaning of "underground
injection," the ways in which SDWA's statutory structure and legislative
190. See DOMINIC C. DIGIULIO, RICHARD T. WILKIN & CARLYLE MILLER, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, EPA 600/R-00/000, INVESTIGATION OF GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION
NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING 33 (2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/wy/pavillion/EPA ReportOnPavillionDec-8-
201 l.pdf (reporting groundwater contamination near wells using fracking service).
191. Meanwhile, during the floor debates, opponents of the amendment offered sting-
ing rebukes that warned of drinking water contamination. 151 CONG. REC. 19,076 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Feingold) ("[T]he energy conference report includes provisions that sig-
nificantly weaken our commitment to the environment and to the health of U.S. citizens....
The bill ... exempts hydraulic fracturing from the Safe Drinking Water Act, and by doing
so, risks contaminating drinking water supplies."); 151 CONG. REC. 19,087 (statement of Sen.
Jeffords) ("The American people do not want enhanced energy production at the expense of
the environment, particularly if it jeopardizes their drinking water wells."); 151 CONG. REC.
14,039 (statement of Sen. Jeffords) ("We need to be moving in the right direction-taking
steps to ensure that hydraulic fracturing is appropriately regulated under the Safe Drinking
Water Act."); 151 CONG. REC. 7114 (statement of Rep. Markey) ("[T]his is truly a bad bill..
. There is a special provision in this bill to protect Halliburton from ever facing any Federal
regulation of a practice of drilling for oil using the hydraulic fracturing technique that actual-
ly injects diesel fuel into the water supply."); 150 CONG. REC. 12,183-84 (2004) (statement
of Rep. Hinchey) ("It undermines the Clean Water Act. It threatens drinking water supplies,
public health, and the environment by exempting hydraulic fracturing, a drilling technique
which injects chemicals into the groundwater.").
192. 149 CONG. REC. 9128 (2003) (statement of Rep. Markey) ("The oil and gas-
related provisions in the Commerce and Resources titles would strip away environmental
protections relating to the oil and gas industry. It would.., prevent the EPA from barring the
injection of diesel fuel into underground sources of drinking water during hydraulic fractur-
ing by excluding oil and gas operations from the Safe Drinking Water Act .. "); 148 CONG.
REC. 2765 (2002) (statement of Sen. Bingaman) ("States already have the authority to regu-
late hydraulic fracturing. They do that through measures such as requiring casing or lining of
oil and gas wells where those wells cross through aquifers. The State regulatory programs
have been effective to date. And although there have been over a million hydraulic fracturing
jobs conducted in the last 5 years, there have been zero confirmed instances of hydraulic
fracturing contaminating drinking water. There is not one time that contamination has been
established."); 148 CONG. REC. 2766 (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (requesting to include in the
record a letter from Carl Smith of the Office of Fossil Energy).
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history reflect on a long-established federalism bargain, and the glaring
holes in the 2005 amendment's rationale-§ 1421(d)(1) is the law of the
land. Part IV addresses this reality directly. The next Section, however, ex-
amines the regulatory exemptions to RCRA and EPCRA that fall within the
EPA's jurisdiction.
III. FEDERALISM CHOICE AND THE EXISTING REGULATORY EXEMPTIONS
FROM RCRA AND EPCRA
Like SDWA, both RCRA and EPCRA offer clear answers to federal-
ism-choice questions. Congress enacted Subtitle C of RCRA in 1976 as a
"cradle to grave" regulatory framework for managing hazardous wastes.'93
Ten years later, Congress enacted EPCRA as a comprehensive regime re-
quiring companies to disclose information related to the storage and use of
hazardous and toxic chemicals. 94 Unlike SDWA, however, where Congress
has exempted non-diesel fuel fracking from regulation, the EPA is responsi-
ble for the existing exemptions under RCRA and EPCRA. This Section
provides an abbreviated overview of these statutes in order to explore the
existing regulatory exemptions in light of federalism choice.
A. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Subtitle C of RCRA provides federal standards for the management of
hazardous wastes from the time of their generation through their disposal.' 95
The statute allows the EPA to delegate implementation and enforcement of
hazardous waste regulations to the states, so long as the state programs are
at least as stringent as the federal regulations.'96 Currently, forty-eight states
have received authorization to manage their own hazardous-waste programs
under RCRA.'97
As with SDWA, RCRA's cooperative federalism structure is intended
to respect state and local priorities while addressing the national problem of
hazardous waste.'98 As reflected in the legislative history, the purpose of the
193. See City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994).
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 1022(d)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2012).
195. Id. § 6922(a)(4) (regulating the creation, transport, treatment, and disposal of
hazardous wastes).
196. Id. § 6926(b); 40 C.F.R. § 271 (2013).
197. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AUTHORIZATION STATUS OF ALL RCRA/HSWA
RULES, (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/laws-regs/state/stats/authall.pdf.
Alaska and Iowa have yet to gain approval for an initial program. See id.
198. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 24 (1976), reprinted in 1 ENV'T & NATURAL RES.
POLICY Div., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SOLID WASTE
DISPOSAL ACT, AS AMENDED, TOGETHER WITH A SECTION-BY-SECTION INDEX 585 (Comm.
Print 1991) [hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT VOL. 1] ("It
is the Committee's intention that the States are to have primary enforcement authority and if
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legislation was to "assist the cities, counties and states in the solution of the
discarded materials problem and to provide nationwide protection against
the dangers of improper hazardous waste disposal."'99 Hazardous waste was
understood to be, and is, fundamentally different from other forms of waste
management: "Many of these substances can blind, cripple or kill. They can
defoliate the environment, contaminate drinking-water supplies and enter
the food chain under preset, largely unregulated disposal practices. ' '2 ° Both
respect for state authority and the guarantee of federal minimum standards
were crucial to the overall plan.2°' Indeed, Congress opted for the coopera-
tive federalism structure because
(1) it provides uniformity among the states as to how hazardous wastes are regulat-
ed, (2) it provides industry and commercial establishments that generate such
wastes [sic] uniformity among states, (3) by providing such uniformity a state with
environmentally sound laws does not drive business out of the state to a state
at any time a State wishes to take over the hazardous waste program it is permitted to do so,
provided that the State laws meet the Federal minimum requirements ....").
199. Id. at 11. In contrast to the cooperative federalism regime for hazardous waste
management, Congress elected to keep solid waste management in state and local hands.
This decision reflected the conclusion that "[s]olid waste management is essentially a local
matter." 121 CONG. REC. 23,850 (1975) (statement of Sen. Randolph), reprinted in A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT VOL. 1, supra note 198, at 192; 122
CONG. REC. 21,401 (1976) (statement of Sen. Randolph), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT VOL. 1, supra note 198, at 387 ("[T]he members of
the Committee on Public Works recognized that solid waste is a uniquely local problem and
that programs in this area should be developed and managed at the local government level.").
200. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 11 (1976), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT VOL. 1, supra note 198, at 558,572.
201. The federalization of hazardous waste management was due to a number of
factors. First, the generation, storage, transport, and disposal of hazardous waste is a wholly
interstate matter. See S. REP. No. 94-988, at 16 (1976), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT VOL. I, supra note 198, at 317, 334 (stating that federal per-
mitting program aims to develop "a coherent system for transporting and handling hazardous
wastes in interstate situations"); H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 3, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT VOL. 1, supra note 198, at 558, 564 ("[M]uch of the
hazardous waste disposed of in an environmentally sound manner is in interstate commerce
without adequate monitoring of its movement or disposition."). Second, it is a threat to which
a degree of uniformity is required. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 21,401 (1976) (statement of
Sen. Randolph), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT VOL. 1,
supra note 198, at 388 ("One of the most urgent solid waste needs to be faced is a uniform
approach to the handling of potentially hazardous materials."); 122 CONG. REC. 21,403
(statement of Sen. Stafford), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL
ACT VOL. 1, supra note 198, at 391 (noting that hazardous waste is "the one area where dan-
ger to public health and welfare calls for direct Federal regulation"); H.R. REP. No. 94-1491,
at 3-4, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT VOL. 1, supra
note 198, at 558, 564-65 ("Unless neutralized or otherwise properly managed in their dispos-
al, hazardous wastes present a clear danger to the health and safety of the population and to
the quality of the environment .... Without a regulatory framework, such hazardous waste
will continue to be disposed of in ponds or lagoons or on the ground in a manner that results
in substantial and sometimes irreversible pollution of the environment.").
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which, for economic reasons, decides to be a dumping ground for hazardous
wastes, and (4) by permitting states to develop and implement hazardous waste
programs equivalent to the federal program, the police power of the states are [sic]
utilized rather than the creation of another federal bureaucracy to implement this
act.
202
Nonetheless, Congress understood that "federal minimum standards are
necessary if the hazardous waste problem is to be understood and solutions
are to be found.""2 3
In passing amendments to RCRA in 1980, Congress temporarily ex-
empted oil and gas exploration and production wastes from regulation under
the statute and mandated that the EPA later determine whether to include
them.2' This temporary exemption was granted because Congress deter-
mined that a set of regulations proposed by the EPA that would have cov-
ered drilling fluids, produced waters, and other oil and gas exploration and
production wastes "could have a significant economic impact" on the indus-
try, and further information on the degree of risk and the efficacy of existing
state and federal programs was required. 5
In 1988, the EPA concluded that federal regulation of oil and gas ex-
ploration and production wastes under RCRA was unnecessary, and regula-
tory goals would be better served by strengthening the UIC permitting pro-
cess under SDWA, passing regulations under another subsection of RCRA,
working with the states to "encourage changes in their regulations and en-
forcement to improve some programs," and working with Congress to po-
tentially create new statutory authority.2 ° The EPA's conclusion was prem-
ised on its finding that alternative regulations were infeasible, state regula-
tions were adequate, and the economic harm suffered by the oil and gas
industry would be severe. 7
Of the factors informing the EPA's decision to exempt oil and gas ex-
ploration and production from RCRA, only the second-the adequacy of
existing state regulation-represents a consideration relevant to the theoret-
ical federalism analysis discussed above.0 ' Assuming state regulations were
202. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 30, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SOLID
WASTE DISPOSAL ACT VOL. 1, supra note 198, at 558, 591.
203. Id.
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A)-(B) (1982).
205. S. REP. No. 96-172, at 6 (1979), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SOLID
WASTE DISPOSAL ACT VOL. 1, supra note 198, at 935, 940.
206. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, Devel-
opment and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446, 25,446-47 (July 6, 1988).
207. Id. at 25,446.
208. The adequacy of existing state law, though not specifically identified as an inde-
pendent factor for federalism choice analysis, is implicit in many of the factors on both sides
of the federalization-decentralization debate, including the federalization concerns with
dealing effectively with interstate externalities and preventing a "race to the bottom" and the
decentralization concerns with local tailoring and experimentation.
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adequate at the time of the EPA's exemption decision,2 °9 there is reason to
believe that they are not adequate now.21° For one thing, although the EPA
did consider hydraulic fracturing in reaching its decision to exempt the in-
dustry, 1 the practice has evolved significantly since then and now involves
different chemical mixes, the practice of horizontal drilling, and other inno-
vations that should give the EPA cause to reconsider its determination that
state laws are adequate. 2  Second, the current status of state regulation of
hazardous waste at fracking sites varies considerably, and there are signifi-
cant gaps.213 For example, of the twenty-eight states that allow for some
fluid storage in open pits, only seventeen impose "[flreeboard
[r]equirements," which require a certain amount of space in the pit between
the maximum water level and the top of the pit, a separation that helps pre-
vent overflow of fluids during wet weather events.214 Only twenty-one of the
twenty-eight open-pit states impose mandatory pit-liner requirements; sev-
eral have conditional pit liner requirements, and four have none.2"' As for
transportation of fracking wastewater, approximately half of the states with
209. But see Hazardous Waste Guidelines and Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946,
58,948 (proposed Dec. 18, 1978) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 250) (describing improper
hazardous waste disposal as a national problem requiring federal intervention).
210. See generally Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 17, at 142-82 (describing a
host of regulatory failures at the state and federal levels); Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation
in Fractured Appalachia, supra note 17, at 241-75 (discussing failures in regulation in the
Appalachian region).
211. See Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration,
Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. at 25,449 (July 6, 1988) ("The major
categories of wastes responsible for damages include reserve pit wastes, fracturing and
acidizing fluids, stimulation chemicals, waste crude oil, produced water, and other miscella-
neous wastes generated by the exploration, development, and production of crude oil and
natural gas."); id. at 25,453-54 (including produced water, drilling fluids, and "stimulation
fluids" in exempt wastes category and excluding "[u]nused fracturing fluids" from exempt
wastes category).
212. See Wiseman, Risk and Response, supra note 17, at 753-79 (discussing risks and
potential regulatory responses associated with use of new and more chemicals, production of
increased quantities of waste, increased water usage, and use of horizontal drilling techniques
and equipment).
213. The non-profit think-tank Resources for the Future's Center for Energy Econom-
ics and Policy has undertaken an initiative to identify risks associated with fracking and to
recommend strategies for more responsible exploration and production. As part of this pro-
ject, the Center is analyzing regulations and surveying regulators in the thirty-one states that
currently have significant shale gas reserves or where industry has shown interest in shale
gas development. Ctr. for Energy Econ. & Policy, supra note 7 (providing maps illustrating
state regulation across a broad range of areas).
214. See id. (follow "Wastewater Storage and Disposal (5)" hyperlink; then follow
"Freeboard Requirements" hyperlink).
215. See id. (follow "Wastewater Storage and Disposal (5)" hyperlink; then follow
"Pit Liner Requirements" hyperlink).
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fracking activities have no reporting requirements whatsoever. t6 The lack
of transport regulations is critical, as that is where a manifest is created, and
the government obtains the ability to track the route and destination of the
hazardous waste. Without a manifest, there is no incentive for the industry
to ensure proper treatment and disposal of the waste.17
These gaps in state regulations and the differences among the state ap-
proaches indicate that RCRA's overarching concerns-providing nation-
wide protection from hazardous wastes and promoting uniformity among
the states-would best be served by rescinding the regulatory exemption.18
In September 2010, a coalition of environmental groups represented
by the Natural Resources Defense Council petitioned the EPA to regulate
hazardous waste associated with oil and gas exploration and production
activities, including fracking, under RCRA. 2 9 The petition argues persua-
sively that fracking produces hazardous waste 20 and that there are signifi-
cant gaps in existing state regulatory regimes that warrant federal interven-
tion to fulfill the statute's purposes.22' The EPA has not yet formally re-
sponded to the petition, though it is still considering its regulatory options.2
2
216. See id. (follow "Wastewater Storage and Disposal (5)" hyperlink; then follow
"Wastewater Transportation Tracking Regulations" hyperlink).
217. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE MGMT. PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
SW- 115, REPORT TO CONGRESS: DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES 17 (1974) (concluding
that the lack of comprehensive national plan disincentivizes proper management of hazard-
ous waste); id. at 21 (recommending that transport and handling should be regulated to "en-
sure that hazardous wastes are properly marked, containerized, and transported").
218. See id. at 22 (discussing problems with the "State-only approach" to hazardous
waste management regulation and benefits of the cooperative federalism approach).
219. Letter from Amy Mall, Senior Analyst, Natural Res. Def. Council & Diane
Donnelly, Legal Intern, Natural Res. Def. Council, to Lisa Jackson, Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene_ 10091301 a.pdf.
220. Id. at 7-17 (demonstrating toxicity of waste and identifying risks to human
health, wildlife, and livestock); id. at 37-41 (arguing that wastes satisfy regulatory criteria for
hazardous waste).
221. Id. at 17-30 (identifying gaps in regulation of pits, land application, injection
wells, wastewater treatment facilities, and other intentional and unintentional spills and
leaks).
222. Natural Gas Extraction-Hydraulic Fracturing, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) ("EPA is
working with states and other key stakeholders to help ensure that natural gas extraction does
not come at the expense of public health and the environment. The Agency's focus and obli-
gations under the law are to provide oversight, guidance and, where appropriate, rulemaking
that achieve the best possible protections for the air, water and land where Americans live,
work and play. The Agency is investing in improving our scientific understanding of hydrau-
lic fracturing, providing regulatory clarity with respect to existing laws, and using existing
authorities where appropriate to enhance health and environmental safeguards.").
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B. The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
The EPCRA was enacted in 1986, following the catastrophic chemical
explosion in Bhopal, India. 23 The statute does not impose any pollution
control requirements on companies; rather, it uses information disclosure as
a means to better inform both decision makers and the public, and to en-
courage industry to reduce or prevent the release of hazardous or toxic
chemicals. 224 Accordingly, the statute requires companies to file annual re-
ports on the amounts of toxics released into the environment or else recy-
cled, treated, or disposed of in impoundments or landfills.22 ' The reports are
published in the Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI) and are made available
online. 26
Under EPCRA, facilities in the manufacturing sector are the only ones
that must be included in the TRI; 227 however, the EPA has the authority to
add additional industry sectors at its discretion. 228 The EPA has recognized
that the original statutory list was meant to serve as a "starting point," and
Congress intended for the TRI program to "evolve to meet the information
needs of a better informed public and to fill information gaps that would
become more apparent over time. ' 229 This is consistent with the broad pur-
poses of the statute to provide a "complete profile of toxic chemical releases
and other waste management activities," to create a national database that
can be used to help measure the "success of environmental regulations," and
to ensure "easy" public access to information about toxic chemicals releas-
es. 2
30
223. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613, 1728-58 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (2006 & Supp. 2012)).
224. Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,791 (Aug. 11,
1995); see also JOHN FELLEMAN, DEEP INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF INFORMATION POLICY IN
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 139 (1997) ("EPCRA is a major example of informational
federalism.").
225. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613, 1741-47 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50).
226. See National Training Conference on TR1 and Environmental Conditions in
Communities, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-
tri-program (last updated Dec. 16, 2013).
227. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 372.22-.23 (2011). The EPA demands that industries classified
by certain Standard Industrial Classification Codes (SICs) must adhere to specified reporting
requirements. Id. § 372.22. However, "Major Group 13: Oil and Gas Extraction" is not one
of the SICs included. Id. § 372.23.
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b)(1)(B).
229. Addition of Facilities in Certain Industry Sectors; Revised Interpretation of
Otherwise Use, Toxic Release Inventory Reporting; Community Right-to-Know, 62 Fed.
Reg. 23,834 (May 1, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
230. Id. at 23,886.
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In 1995, President Bill Clinton directed the agency to expand the
range of industries covered under the Act.2 31 In 1996 and 1997, pursuant to §
313(b)(1)(B), the EPA added several sectors to the list, including mining for
coal and mining for metals.232 Although the EPA considered the oil and gas
extraction industry a "Tier I" candidate for inclusion-meaning it was
among those whose toxic release disclosures would best serve the purposes
of the statute233-the agency ultimately deferred reconsideration because of
uncertainty about how or whether individual drilling wells would fit under
the statutory definition of "facilit[y]. ' '234 As a result, the chemical contents
of fracking fluids remain, like chemicals used in other oil and gas explora-
tion and production activities, exempt from EPCRA. 35
In October 2012, a coalition of environmental groups spearheaded by
the Environmental Integrity Project petitioned the EPA to initiate rulemak-
ing under EPCRA to add the entire oil and gas extraction industry to the list
of facilities required to report toxic releases under the TRI. 36 In deciding
whether to add an industrial sector to the TRI list, the EPA will consider
three factors: (1) the "'chemical' factor," which asks whether it is likely that
one or more toxic chemicals will be present at facilities within the industry;
(2) the "'activity' factor," which asks whether facilities within the sector
"'manufacture,' 'process,' or 'otherwise use' the present toxic chemicals;
and (3) the "'information' factor," which asks whether disclosure by facili-
231. Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,791 (Aug. 11,
1995).
232. Addition of Facilities in Certain Industry Sectors; Revised Interpretation of
Otherwise Use; Toxic Release Inventory Reporting; Community Right-to-Know, 62 Fed.
Reg. at 23,834.
233. Addition of Facilities in Certain Industry Sectors; Revised Interpretation of
Otherwise Use; Toxic Release Inventory Reporting; Community Right-to-Know, 61 Fed.
Reg. 33,591-92 (proposed June 27, 1996).
234. Id. at 33,592.
235. An emergency report, however, must be prepared if a hazardous substance re-
lease exceeds certain thresholds. 42 U.S.C. § 1 1004(a)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (requiring
an operator to report a release of an "extremely hazardous substance" listed in § 103(a) of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9601(14)); see also Susan Phillips, EPA Fines Talisman Energy for Fracking Violations,
STATEIMPACT PA. (July 25, 2012, 1:30 PM),
http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2012/07/25/epa-fines-talisman-energy-for-fracking-
violations/.
236. See Letter from Eric Schaeffer, Exec. Dir., Envtl. Integrity Project & Adam
Kron, Attorney, Envtl. Integrity Project, to Lisa Jackson, Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency
(Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from Eric Schaeffer], available at
http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/news reports/documents/2012 10 24TRIPetitionFIN
ALSIGNED.pdf The petitioners define the oil and gas extraction industry to include all
aspects of well exploration and development, including "drilling," well construction, "hy-
draulic fracturing," "processing," "abandonment," and "associated components... such as
waste pits, storage tanks, and compressors." Id. at 2 n.2.
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ties within the industry will increase the amount of information available or
"otherwise further the purposes of EPCRA. 237 Of these, only the third fac-
tor raises questions that pertain to federalism; the other two factors may be
answered one way or another regardless of whether an industrial sector is
located entirely within one state's borders or operates nationwide.238
The federalism question raised by the "information" factor of the
EPA's TRI analysis asks whether existing state and, arguably, voluntary
information disclosure rules provide an adequate amount of information to
satisfy the statute's purposes. With regard to fracking, the answer is "No. 239
A number of states with fracking operations have adopted their own frack-
ing fluid disclosure requirements, but approximately half of them have
not.24° Of the states that do require both disclosure of some of the substances
and public access to the information, none require comprehensive disclo-
sure, 241 and none provide accessibility to the same degree as the TRI. In
addition, studies have found enforcement of state disclosure rules to be une-
ven. 242 These failures at the state level undermine any possible argument
that state activity in this area militates against federal regulation. Rather,
federal action appears to be necessary to achieve the statutory purposes of a
"complete profile of toxic chemical releases," of providing information with
237. Addition of Facilities in Certain Industry Sectors; Revised Interpretation of
Otherwise Use; Toxic Release Inventory Reporting; Community Right-to-Know, 62 Fed.
Reg. at 23,836.
238. See Letter from Eric Schaeffer, supra note 236, at 22-59 (applying the first two
factors to oil and gas extraction industry).
239. See id. at 63-66 (discussing state fracking disclosure requirements).
240. See Ctr. for Energy Econ. & Policy, supra note 7 (follow "Hydraulic Fracturing
(2)" hyperlink; then follow "Fracking Fluid Disclosure Regulations" hyperlink). See general-
ly McFEELEY, supra note 17.
241. As a general matter, disclosure rules provide an exemption for confidential
information that falls under "trade secret" protection. See MCFEELEY, supra note 17, at 6; see
also Ben Elgin, Benjamin Haas & Phil Kuntz, Fracking Secrets by Thousands Keep US.
Clueless on Wells, BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov. 30, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-30/frack-secrets-by-thousands-keep-u-s-clueless-
on-wells.html (reporting that companies in Texas claimed trade secret exemption from dis-
closure 19,000 times through August of that year); Michael Anderson, The Problem with
Fracking Trade Secrets, GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. BLOG (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://gielr.wordpress.com/2013/04/25/the-problem-with-fracking-trade-secrets/ (discussing
lack of disclosure resulting from trade secret protections in state regulations).
242. See MCFEELEY, supra note 17, at 8-9; see also Wiseman, Risk and Response,
supra note 17, at 758-59 (describing state disclosure rules); Wiseman, Fractured Appalachia,
supra note 17, at 276 (noting that "the regulations in some states fail to require the produc-
tion of information that will be necessary to inform future, improved analysis of regulatory
needs with respect to fracing").
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which to measure the efficacy of environmental regulations, and of ensuring
"easy" public access for affected communities.243
There are at least two other counterarguments to regulating fiacking
under EPCRA that warrant mention here. First, as with the question of
whether fracking fits under the definition of "underground injection," there
is some question as to whether EPCRA properly applies to fracking. The
question of applicability, however, is, again, an entirely separate question
from the federalism question that is the subject of this Article. The federal-
ism question asks whether the disclosure of information pertaining to toxic
chemical releases is properly conceived as a regulatory choice best allocated
to the federal government or the states. Congress has determined, and with
good reason, that it is a choice best left to the federal government. 2' The
question of whether EPCRA should apply to fracking, then, is not a federal-
ism question at all; rather, it is an implementation question, properly con-
sidered under the EPA's multi-factor analysis for adding new industry sec-
tors to the TRI.245
Second, one might argue that other proposed federal regulations slated
for enactment will adequately fill the gaps left by state regulation and vol-
untary information disclosure. Two proposed federal regulations are rele-
vant here. First, in response to a petition filed by the environmental group
Earthjustice, 2" the EPA has committed to regulating chemical disclosure
under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).2 47 The EPA will initiate
243. Addition of Facilities in Certain Industry Sectors; Revised Interpretation of
Otherwise Use; Toxic Release Inventory Reporting; Community Right-to-Know, 62 Fed.
Reg. 23,836 (May 1, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
244. See, e.g., Guest Blogger, State, Local Officials Try to Halt Federal TRI Cut-
backs, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV'T (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/2777
(noting that the EPA asserted that changes to TRI program "did not have any federalism
implications").
245. See Addition of Facilities in Certain Industry Sectors; Revised Interpretation of
Otherwise Use; Toxic Release Inventory Reporting; Community Right-to-Know, 62 Fed.
Reg. at 23,836; see also supra notes 236, 238-39 (discussing Environmental Integrity Project
petition).
246. See generally Letter from Deborah Goldberg & Megan Klein, Earthjustice, to
Lisa P. Jackson, Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Aug. 4, 2011), available at
http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/frackingpetition.pdf (discussing the Citizen Petition
Under Toxic Substances Control Act Regarding the Chemical Substances and Mixtures Used
in Oil and Gas Exploration or Production).
247. See Letter from Stephen A. Owens, Assistant Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
to Deborah Goldberg, Earthjustice (Nov. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Stephen A. Ow-
ens], available at
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/pubs/EPALetter to Earthjustice onTSCAPetition.pdf
(regarding TSCA Section 21 Petition Concerning Chemical Substances and Mixtures Used in
Oil and Gas Exploration or Production). The letter also denied the petition's request to re-
quire disclosure related to chemicals used for purposes other than hydraulic fracturing. Id. at
2.
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rulemaking that will obtain data on chemical substances and mixtures used
in hydraulic fracturing from manufacturers and processors. 248 Notably, in its
decision letter, the EPA recognized that the chemical content of fracking
operations raises specifically federal concerns and that "TSCA may be a
valuable authority to provide a national picture of the chemical substances
and mixtures used in hydraulic fracturing. '249 Second, in May 2012, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of Interior issued a
proposed rule for fracking on public lands and Indian reservations. 20 The
proposed rule-which would require that some contents of fracking fluids
be disclosed on the industry-funded inventory FracFocus while allowing
companies to keep other contents secret' and would require that companies
conduct a well integrity test on a single well in a field, rather than each
wel 252-- represented a scaling back from an earlier proposal, which would
have required full disclosure and more testing.253 The oil and gas industry
have continued to oppose the rule, and many environmentalists have voiced
dissatisfaction with it as well. 5
248. See Chemical Substances and Mixtures Used in Oil and Gas Exploration or
Production; TSCA Section 21 Petition; Reasons for Agency Response, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,768,
41,768-71 (July 11,2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
249. Letter from Stephen A. Owens, supra note 247. The EPA also denied the peti-
tion in part, rejecting the request to require that manufacturers and processors conduct toxici-
ty testing on the same chemicals. Id. In addition, the EPA has already issued at least one rule
pursuant to TSCA requiring that companies notify the EPA of their intent to use certain
chemicals used in fracking. See Significant New Use Rules on Certain Chemical Substances,
78 Fed. Reg. 27,048, 27,048-57 (May 9, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 721).
250. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and
Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691, 27,691-92 (proposed May 11,2012) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 3,160). The rule is being issued pursuant to the agency's authority under the Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act, the Mineral Leasing Act, the Mineral Leasing Act for
Acquired Lands, and the Indian Mineral Leasing Act. Id. at 27,694.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 27,705-08.
253. Id. at 27,691,27,702-03.
254. See, e.g., John M. Broder, New Fracking Rules Proposed for U.S. Land, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 2013, at AI5 ("'D.O.I. still has not justified the rule from an economic or
scientific point of view. It continues to second-guess states and tribes, and will hurt job crea-
tion and economic growth in Western communities."' (quoting a spokesperson for Western
Energy Alliance)); Meg Handley, New Federal Fracking Rules Rile Environmentalists, Oil
and Gas Industry, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 17, 2013, at I ("'The states are the best
regulators for the industry .... The Department of Interior doesn't need to take on another
layer of regulation when they have no personnel or budget to support it."' (quoting an energy
company executive)); Id. ("'States are much better suited to regulate hydraulic fracturing and
have done an effective job. The new rule is duplicative to state regulation and the Depart-
ment of Interior's rule fails to provide a credible rationale as to why another set of regula-
tions are needed."' (quoting an U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for the 21' t Century
executive)).
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The problem with the argument that the EPA's and BLM's proposed
federal regulations weigh against the theoretical argument for federal regu-
lation under EPCRA is apparent on its face: the fact that other federal agen-
cies are regulating some part of chemical content disclosure does not sup-
port the argument that the federal government is not the proper scale of
governance on this issue. In fact, it would seem to support the precisely
opposite view.255 Moreover, there are crucial differences among the statuto-
ry regimes: the EPA's TSCA regulations will not regulate toxic chemical
release information disclosure in the way that EPCRA does, and BLM's
proposed rule applies only to fracking operations on federal public lands or
Indian lands, not to private property (where much fracking is done) or non-
federal public lands. Thus, once these regulations are in place, the purposes
of EPCRA will still not be satisfied.
This Part and the one that preceded it have demonstrated that a close
reading of the relevant statutes, their legislative histories, and the trajectory
of regulatory decision making leads to the conclusion that fracking should,
as a matter of both theory and law, be regulated under SDWA, RCRA, and
EPCRA. The final Part further examines current regulatory developments
and what steps might be taken to fill the remaining gaps in fracking regula-
tion.
IV. THE (RE)FEDERALIZATION OF FRACKING REGULATION: UPDATES AND
PROPOSALS
As the public controversy surrounding hydraulic fracturing's envi-
ronmental impacts continues and the economic boom it produces spreads
nationwide, the federal government is adopting an increasingly involved
role in regulation. This final Part provides a summary status update on the
various ways in which Congress and federal agencies are or are considering
regulating fracking. It then considers the federalism questions attendant to a
number of possibilities for future regulation, including repealing the 2005
SDWA amendment, establishing a "one-stop shop" for federal permitting,
regulating underground injection of fracking fluids through existing state
SDWA programs, and creating a new mechanism to promote policy and
technology innovation through a federal- or state-level collaborative net-
work.
255. See Natural Gas Extraction-Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 222; LINDA-Jo
SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34118, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT
(TSCA): IMPLEMENTATION AND NEW CHALLENGES 10-11 (updated ed. 2008); LINDA-Jo
SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA):
IMPLEMENTATION AND NEW CHALLENGES 6-7, 20-22 (2007) (discussing TSCA's structure
and federalism balance in regulation of toxic chemicals).
1531
Michigan State Law Review
A. The Current Status of Federal Regulation
In May 2013, U.S. Representatives Diana DeGette (D-CO) and Chris
Gibson (R-NY) reintroduced the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness
of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act).256 The bipartisan bill would undo the 2005
amendment exempting non-diesel fuel fracking from SDWA and explicitly
include the underground injection of fluids and other agents used in hydrau-
lic fracturing within SDWA regulations; the FRAC Act would also require
disclosure of the chemical constituents of fracking fluids (though not the
formulas) to either the EPA or the relevant state agency, depending on the
regulatory framework in place.257 The bill's prospects, however, are dim.
The FRAC Act was previously introduced in 2009 and 2011, and has never
made it out of committee. 258 Given the current political climate, even if the
EPA were to conclude beyond any doubt that fracking poses a significant
risk to underground drinking-water supplies, there is little reason to believe
that the bill would gain traction any time in the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, federal agencies have undertaken a number of measures-
in addition to the likely regulations under TSCA and the BLM's oil and gas
leasing program-that have begun to regulate fracking in significant ways.
Perhaps the most important federal action to date, at least for the purposes
of this Article, occurred in May 2012, when the EPA issued a draft permit-
ting guidance for fracking operations that involve the underground injection
of fluids, including diesel fuel . 9 The draft guidance states that it is the
EPA's interpretation that fracking wells that inject diesel fuels are subject to
the UIC program's Class II permit requirements 260 and provides recommen-
dations on how permit writers should implement requirements related to
applications and review, permit duration and well closure, and well con-
struction.26' For states that have primacy under either § 1422 or § 1425 of
SDWA, the guidance offers a number of recommendations for how to ap-
proach regulation.262
The draft guidance is necessarily premised, in part, on the agency's
conclusion that fracking with diesel fuel can endanger underground drink-
256. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2013, H.R. 1921,
113th Cong. (2013).
257. Id. The bill would also require the immediate disclosure of trade secret chemi-
cals and proprietary formulas of hydraulic fracturing fluids used in the case of an emergency.
Id.
258. See Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S.
1215, 11 1th Cong. (2009); Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act, S.
587, 112th Cong. (2011).
259. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 104.
260. Id. at 1.
261. Id.atl2-31.
262. Id. at 31-34.
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ing-water supplies; this endangerment may occur through any of a number
of different "pathways," including migration of fluids through a faulty injec-
tion well casing, through the annulus between the well casing and the well
bore, from an injection zone through the formation's confining strata, and
through improperly abandoned or completed wells.26 3 As noted above, the
EPA is currently studying these same "pathways of contamination" (along
with others at the surface) as part of its effort to help better inform govern-
ments and the public regarding the risks involved with fracking that does
not use diesel fuels." These pathways are the same that have informed the
EPA's UIC permit program regulations since their first promulgation.265
A great deal of attention has been placed on the EPA study, which is
expected to be issued in 2014 and to reach a conclusion one way or the oth-
er regarding the potential for fracking to contaminate drinking-water sup-
plies. This attention has put enormous political pressure on what is sup-
posed to be a politically neutral risk assessment, potentially ruining the pro-
spect that it will provide a satisfactory answer for anyone. Significantly, at
least for the purposes of this Article, this attention is misplaced. Indeed, the
focus on the EPA study is emblematic of the miscomprehension that
plagues much of the debate about the appropriate scale of governance in this
area, for the EPA study will not resolve fracking's federalism question. Ra-
ther, the EPA study is designed to answer a question about SDWA's ap-
plicability--that is, whether injection of fracking fluids underground, in-
cluding into areas beneath potential underground drinking-water supplies,
has the potential to endanger drinking-water supplies. As noted above,266 if
there is such a potential then, in the absence of the "Halliburton loophole,"
the statute would apply. If, however, regulation would "stop or substantially
delay" oil and gas production and there is not a potential to endanger drink-
ing-water supplies, then SDWA would quite simply not apply. Given the
fracking exemption to SDWA, however, it does not matter what the EPA's
study reveals. Whatever the results, SDWA will not, without further Con-
gressional action, apply to fracking that does not use diesel fuel. Perhaps
such a finding would encourage states to go further than the federal statute
requires, but it would not necessarily require it.267 This result would be
plainly inconsistent with the language of the pre-2005 SDWA, with the pur-
263. Id. at A-1 to A-4.
264. See 2011 EPA REPORT, supra note 42, at 27-35, 62-75.
265. See OFFICE OF DRINKING WATER, supra note 168, at 7-17.
266. See supra notes 144-56.
267. But see infra notes 291-94 and accompanying text (discussing the California
lawsuit).
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poses and structure of the Act, and with the federalism choices it repre-
sents.268
Meanwhile, the EPA is also moving towards increased regulation of
fracking under the CWA. As part of this project, the EPA is developing
effluent limitations guidelines for the discharge of wastewater from both
coalbed methane wells and shale gas wells. 269 Direct discharges from frack-
ing operations are already subject to federal regulations under the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit program, but the EPA has
not yet established the guidelines necessary to create the technology-based
effluent limitations that must be included in permits. 2 ° The agency expects
the rule to be issued in 2014. In addition, the EPA is also updating its chlo-
ride water quality standards for protection of aquatic life. 7' Chloride is a
major component of total dissolved solids, which are present in high levels
in fracking wastewater.272
The EPA has also begun regulating air emissions from fracking wells.
In 2012, in response to litigation filed by environmental groups, the EPA
issued a final rule imposing new regulations on emissions of volatile organ-
ic compounds (VOCs) from fracking operations.273 The agency believes the
rule is likely to produce the co-benefit of reduced methane emissions. 274 The
268. See discussion supra Sections 11.B-C. The result is also inconsistent with the
precautionary approach of the statute and the balancing of public and private interests it
embodies. Typically, SDWA places the burden on an applicant for an UIC permit to show
that there is no endangerment, and so the costs for studying the issue are borne by the indus-
try. The current arrangement has created the assumption that there is no endangerment and
put the costs for studying the issue on the public, through government studies such as the
EPA's and through private lawsuits seeking compensation after the fact of harm. See 42
U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2012).
269. Notice of Final 2010 Effluent Guidelines Program Plan, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,286
(Oct. 26, 2011).
270. See Unconventional Extraction in the Oil and Gas Industry, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/oilandgas/unconv.cfm (last visited
Jan. 22, 2014).
271. See Natural Gas Extraction-Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 222.
272. Id.
273. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490, 49,492
(Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63) ("For fractured and refractured gas
wells, the rule generally requires owners/operators to use reduced emissions completions,
also known as 'RECs' or 'green completions,' to reduce VOC emissions from well comple-
tions.").
274. Id. at 49,513 ("[T]he control measures that the EPA is requiring for VOC result
in substantial methane reductions as a co-benefit."). The quantity of methane emissions from
fracking wells has been a hotly debated topic. See R.L. SANTORO, R.H. HOWARTH & A.R.
INGRAFFEA, AGRIC., ENERGY, & ENV'T PROGRAM, CORNELL UNIV., INDIRECT EMISSIONS OF
CARBON DIOXIDE FROM MARCELLUS SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 14 (2011), available at
http://www.eeb.cornell.edulhowarth/IndirectEmissionsofCarbonDioxidefromMarcellusShale
GasDevelopmentJune302Ol1%20.pdf, Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro & Anthony
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EPA further maintains that fracking operations may be subject to green-
house gas reporting requirements, and voluntary efforts under the agency's
Natural Gas STAR program and Clean Construction USA program produce
further air quality benefits. 75 Numerous parties have filed lawsuits challeng-
ing the rule.276
The above actions demonstrate that the federalization of fracking
regulation is already well underway and that, consistent with this Article's
argument, more and more aspects of the process are being brought under the
management of existing federal regimes. However, significant regulatory
gaps remain. The next Section analyzes several possibilities for prospective
regulation that may help fill those gaps.
B. Possible Next Steps
Politicians, advocates, and scholars have posited a number of possible
next steps for fracking regulation, including (1) enacting the FRAC Act; (2)
establishing a "one-stop shop" or comprehensive program at the federal
level for fracking permits; (3) granting the remaining regulatory petitions
and continuing the ad hoc, media-specific approach adopted to date; and (4)
regulating the underground injection of fracking fluids pursuant to existing
state SDWA laws and regulations. The federalism-choice issues involved in
granting the remaining RCRA and EPCRA petitions and otherwise proceed-
ing with the status quo have been discussed earlier in the Article. Accord-
ingly, this Section considers the other three possibilities in light of federal-
ism choice. In addition, recognizing the unlikelihood of direct federal regu-
lation and the failure of the states to fill remaining regulatory gaps when
Ingraffea, Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale For-
mations, 106 CLIMATIC CHANGE 679,685 (2011); Lawrence M. Cathles III et al., A Commen-
tary on "The Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas in Shale Formations " by R. W.
Howarth, R. Santoro, andAnthony Ingraffea, 113 CLIMATIC CHANGE 525, 533 (2012); Robert
W. Howarth, Renee Santoro & Anthony Ingraffea, Venting and Leaking of Methane from
Shale Gas Development: Response to Cathles et al., 113 CLIMATIC CHANGE 537, 538-39
(2012); Press Release, Lawrence M. Cathles et al., Response to Howarth et al.'s Reply (Feb.
29, 2012), available at
http://www.geo.comell.edu/eas/PeoplePlaces/Faculty/cathles/Natura1%20Gas/Response%20t
o%20Howarth's%2OReply/o2ODistributed%2OFeb%2030,%202012.pdf, L.M. Cathles,
Assessing the Greenhouse Impact of Natural Gas, GEOCHEMISTRY GEOPHYSICS GEOSYSTEMS,
June 19, 2012, at 1, 1-2, available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/1 0.1029/2012GC004032/asset/ggge2195.pd?,v=l &t=hq
yc3I9d&s=96f2O6ll3bfb8cdOb3ale9fb94dlddd9Oad33385; David T. Allen et al., Measure-
ments of Methane Emissions at Natural Gas Production Sites in the United States, 110 PNAS
17768, 17768 (2013).
275. Natural Gas Extraction-Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 222.
276. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, No. 12-1405 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 15, 2012).
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acting independently, I make a proposal for a new interstate mechanism to
promote policy diffusion.
1. Enactment of the FRAC Act
Enactment of the FRAC Act, with its proposed revocation of SDWA
exemption and requirement for toxic chemical content disclosure on a well-
by-well basis, would be fully consistent with the federalism-choice analyses
presented above. Passage of the bill would resolve the discontinuity be-
tween the law's treatment of fracking and other industrial activities with
similar risks and impacts. However, the bill, at least as currently drafted,
would not address the hazardous waste management issue. Thus, it would
represent a substantial improvement over the current state of affairs, but it
would not offer a total solution. Of course, as previously noted, the FRAC
Act as drafted has little chance of passing through Congress.277
2. Establishment of a "One-Stop Shop "for Fracking Permits
One potential work-around congressional resistance to legislatively re-
instating SDWA's full jurisdictional reach and overriding the TRI reporting
exemption could be to create a new "one-stop shop" for federal fracking
permits within the EPA or a state agency that has been delegated authority
to implement federal environmental statutes.278 Such a program could be
established through legislation or administrative action. If done administra-
tively, the program could coordinate the permitting process under existing
or forthcoming regulatory requirements under the CWA (for surface-level
wastewater disposal), the CAA (for VOCs emissions), SDWA (for under-
ground injection of wastewater and underground injection of fracking fluid
that includes diesel fuel), and the TSCA (for disclosure of chemical con-
tent), as well as any potentially forthcoming requirements under RCRA and
the EPCRA. The permit process could also include permits necessary for
underground injection of fracking fluids in states that may require a permit
pursuant to their state SDWA program.279 If done legislatively, Congress
could decide to revoke the 2005 EPAct amendment and bring Underground
Injection Control permitting into the same consolidated process.
277. See supra notes 258-60.
278. See Jody Freeman, The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2012, at A23 (arguing for uniform federal regulation of fracking); Should the Federal Gov-
ernment Regulate Fracking?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424127887323495104578314302738867078.html
(providing short arguments for and against uniform minimum standards for fracking).
279. See infra Subsection IV.B.4.
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Such a process would reopen the debate to legislative bargaining, and
it would not be without precedent. For example, the 2005 EPAct granted
authority to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to coordinate the
processing of federal and state authorizations required under federal law for
natural gas projects and to maintain a consolidated record of decisions for
judicial review.80 On the state level, Article 10 of the New York State Pub-
lic Service Law provides for a uniform process for permitting power plants
in the state.281
Notably, both liquefied natural gas (LNG) permitting under the EPAct
and power plant siting in New York under Article 10 have preemptive ef-
fects-the EPAct on state and local authority, 2 2 Article 10 on localities'
home-rule power.283 The preemptive reach of these consolidated processes is
important in the case of fracking because passage of any legislation-
whether it be the FRAC Act or new legislation focused on permitting-
would likely depend on the oil and gas industry reaching the conclusion that
federalization would serve its own interests and therefore shifting its sup-
port toward federal regulation. 84 Most likely, industry's position would
adjust if it perceived federal uniformity as a stabilizing factor that would
serve its economic ends, either because state regulations become so uneven
and "patchwork-y" that they are unwieldy for national companies to navi-
gate or because a uniform, consolidated federal permitting process would
add enough efficiency to warrant the additional cost. Either way, the dra-
matic shift in the industry's position would almost certainly necessitate a
trade-off: support for federal regulation in exchange for preemption of local
bans and moratoria.285 A thorough analysis of the localism issues raised by
this probability is beyond the scope of this Article;286 however, the trade-off
may well be a necessary consideration in the progress of a new federal law.
3. Regulation Under State SD WA Programs
While Congress has amended SDWA to exempt fracking from the
UIC permit program, at least some states with primacy under the Act have
280. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 685, 688
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. 2012)).
281. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 160-173 (McKinney 2013).
282. Energy Policy Act of 2005 §311(e)(1), 119 Stat. at 686.
283. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 172.
284. See generally William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption,
and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007); Glicksman & Levy, supra
note 28, at 583.
285. 1 am indebted to Rick Hills for highlighting this important probability.
286. For useful starting points on this issue, see Hills, Is Federalism Goodfor Local-
ism?, supra note 33, at 189-95; Briffault, supra note 33, at 452.
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not amended their statutes and regulations to reflect this exemption.287 Ac-
cordingly, it may be that fracking should, as a matter of law, be regulated
under any number of state UIC permitting programs or other state environ-
mental statutes.
This possibility is currently percolating through the agencies and
courts in California. In November 2012, the California Division of Oil, Gas,
and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) responded to a critical EPA report on
its UIC permit program by committing to initiate rulemaking to increase
groundwater protection.288 In the plan, DOGGR indicates the rulemaking
will address the UIC program as well as well construction and plugging and
abandonment regulations. 289 However, in a Discussion Draft of proposed
fracking regulations, DOGGR declared that "[w]ell stimulation . . . opera-
tions, including hydraulic fracturing, are not underground injection or dis-
posal projects and are not subject to" the state's UIC permit program. 20 The
agency was subsequently sued by the Center for Biological Diversity, which
claims that the agency's failure to adequately regulate fracking wells vio-
lates both the UIC regulations and the state's Public Resources Code.29'
Plaintiffs' theory, in short, is that California's existing UIC program, under
which it assumed primacy, was more protective than SDWA; that the state
had not, until recently, changed the definition of underground injection in
the wake of the 2005 amendments; and that other requirements pertaining to
oil and gas wells were not being applied to fracking wells. 292 California has
287. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 317-7-6 (2013); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-1-02
(2013); ARK. CODER. § 17.501 (LexisNexis 2013); Wis. ADMIN. CODE NR § 815.07 (2013);
OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 252:652-1-2 (2013); W. VA. CODER. § 47-13-1 (2013); WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 173-218-110 (2013); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 33-25-01-06 (2013); 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 331.201 (2013); 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 02C.0211 (2013); 25 PA. CODE § 78.11 (2013);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 445A.470 (2013); 26-2 MISS. CODE R. § 1.63 (LexisNexis 2013); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 552.1 (McKinney 2013).
288. See Letter from Tim Kustic, State Oil & Gas Supervisor, to David Albright,
Ground Water Office, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Nov. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/Documents/DOGGR%20cover%/20letter%/20for%/2OUS
EPA%20response.pdf; Div. OIL, GAS, & GEOTHERMAL RES., CAL. DEP'T OF CONSERVATION,
UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL ACTION PLAN (2012), available at
http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/Documents/DOGGR%20response%20to%20USEPA%
20underground%20injection%20report.pdf.
289. Dlv. OIL, GAS, & GEOTHERMAL RES., supra note 288.
290. Discussion Draft of Regulations Hydraulic Fracturing Regulations Banner,
supra note 44.
291. Complaint at 4, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cal. Dep't of Conservation, No.
RG13664534 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2013).
292. Id. at 9.
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subsequently proposed a comprehensive permit regime for fracking,293 and
industry defendants have moved to dismiss the lawsuit as moot. 94
It is plausible that environmental groups in other states may challenge
the failure of states to regulate fracking under their own unamended state
statutes and state regulatory programs. Ultimately, these lawsuits may result
in more states regulating fracking under their UIC permit programs or, like
California, under new permitting programs, which may impact the federal-
ism analysis by strengthening the adequacy of existing state regulations and
detracting from the need for federal intervention. Alternatively, these law-
suits may result in states amending statutes and regulations to mimic Con-
gress's legislative exemption, which would tilt the balance in the other di-
rection, potentially highlighting the need for federal action. In either event,
the role of the states in providing for drinking-water protection under state
law will undoubtedly remain a prominent part of the federalism discussion.
4. Promoting Policy Diffusion Through Federal Intervention or Inter-
state Collaboration
The thrust of this Article has been that federal regulation of hydraulic
fracturing is appropriate because the existing legislative and regulatory ex-
clusions do not reflect a legitimate theoretical federalism analysis, the lan-
guage and purposes of the relevant statutes, or the realities of the industry
today. Nonetheless, largely due to partisan politics and the strong influence
of industry interest groups, federal regulation has been slow to develop.
Moreover, future federal regulation in these areas ranges from possible to
improbable to nearly impossible to imagine. A new question, then, arises: in
the absence of direct federal regulation of drinking-water impacts, hazard-
ous waste management, and toxic release information disclosure, how can
the federal government and/or states ensure that innovative policies and best
practices spread from state to state?
The political science literature on policy diffusion provides a helpful
lens through which to examine this question. "Policy diffusion" refers to the
process through which innovations spread from one government to another,
where "innovation" refers to any policy that is new to a government.295
Here, such innovations would include any regulation of fracking's potential
drinking-water impacts and the spread of best practices pertaining to haz-
293. S.B. 4, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
294. See Oil Industry Cites New Law in Seeking Dismissal of California Fracking
Suit, INSIDEEPA.coM (Oct. 24, 2013), http://insideepa.com/Inside-Cal/EPA/Inside-CaUEPA-
10/25/2013/oil-industry-cites-new-law-in-seeking-dismissal-of-califomia-fracking-
suit/menu-id- 1097.html.
295. Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 880, 881 (1969).
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ardous wastewater produced by the process and information disclosure per-
taining to the chemical content of fracking fluids. Studies of policy diffu-
sion have analyzed how innovations reach a significant level of prominence
among policy makers, the effect of regional ties and different types of pro-
fessional networks on diffusion, and what effects the success of innovations
have on their spread.296 There are at least four major mechanisms at play in
policy diffusion: (1) learning from early adopters; (2) economic competition
among proximate adopters; (3) imitation or emulation; and (4) coercion by
supreme governments.297 A short assessment of the applicability of these
mechanisms to fracking demonstrates that coercion by supreme govern-
ments is the most likely mechanism to promote the spread of policy innova-
tions in this area. 98
First, as previously noted, the "learning" component of policy diffu-
sion is an important component of the "laboratories" argument common to
American federalism; that is, for the idea that a diversity of state approaches
produces useful knowledge to have any force, the information being gener-
ated in one state must actually be shared and used elsewhere. 99 Learning,
then, occurs when a government actually has the opportunity to observe the
political process and impact that an innovation has elsewhere. In order to
effectively learn, governments must make an appraisal of whether an inno-
vation has been successful elsewhere; success is viewed both politically, by
296. See Michael Mintrom & Sandra Vergari, Policy Networks and Innovation Diffu-
sion: The Case of State Education Reforms, 60 J. ON POL. 126, 126-27 (1998); Michael Min-
trom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 Am. J. POL. Sci. 738, 738-39
(1997); Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children's
Health Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. POL. SC. 294, 295 (2006); Craig Volden, The Politics
of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom in Welfare Benefits?, 46 AM. J. POL. SCi.
352, 352-54 (2002).
297. Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 840, 840, 851 (2008) (noting all four of these mechanisms as producing "strong
patterns of policy diffusion").
298. While "policy innovation" in general refers to any previously unutilized policy,
here I mean to refer specifically to policies that provide for protection of drinking water
supplies, stringent regulation of hazardous wastes, and disclosure of information related to
toxic releases.
299. See, e.g., Craig Volden, Michael M. Ting & Daniel P. Carpenter, A Formal
Model of Learning and Policy Diffusion, 102 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 319, 319 (2008) ("[T]he
devolution of authority in federal systems is often based on the argument that states and
localities may act as policy laboratories, experimenting with various alternatives, abandoning
the failures, and adopting successful policies found elsewhere. If such learning and diffusion
is in fact quite limited, then one of the major justifications for decentralization is lost.");
Hannah Wiseman, Fixing the Information Deficit in Federalism (unpublished manuscript),
available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/programs/searlecenter/events/energy/documents[W
iseman Fixing Information Deficit Federalism rough draft Novl 2.pdf.
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a lack of repeal, and on policy grounds, through the effectiveness in general
of the innovation. °
Yet, there is little evidence that there has been any real learning with
regard to state fracking regulations.31' This is true despite the existence of
extensive professional networks and ample opportunities for information
sharing.32 The primary means for interstate learning in this context are the
website FracFocus.org, published by the Ground Water Protection Council
and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC), 3°3 and the
State Review of Oil & Gas Environmental Regulations (STRONGER), a
non-profit organization with members from industry, government, and the
non-profit sector whose mission is to share information about state regula-
tions.3" FracFocus.org provides centralized access to some information on
the chemical content of some fracking fluids, as well as a database of state
regulations related to fracking. STRONGER provides the opportunity for
states to submit their regulations for review. However, FracFocus.org is far
from comprehensive and has been heavily criticized for its limitations.3"5 As
300. Shipan & Volden, supra note 297, at 842.
301. The only instance I am of aware of in which a state agency has made explicit
reference to another state's regulations was to demonstrate how the other state had fallen
short. See N.Y. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FACT SHEET: WHAT WE LEARNED FROM
PENNSYLVANIA (2011), available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/administrationpdf/pafactsheet072011.pdf (describing New
York Department of Environmental Conservation officials' visit to a Pennsylvania fracking
site that was experiencing equipment failure). This limited evidence of intergovernmental
learning is consistent with what some political scientists have identified as a potential trend.
See Volden, Ting & Carpenter, supra note 299, at 320 ("[M]any current techniques to un-
cover evidence of diffusion could find such patterns even if government decisions were made
independently of one another.").
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supra note 296, at 126; Mintrom, supra note 296, at 739; Walker, supra note 295, at 896.
Membership in such a network is not in itself sufficient, however, as networks can lead un-
desirable emulation of imperfect or less effective practices. Fuiglister, supra, at 320-2 1.
303. FRACFocus, http://www.fracfocus.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
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for STRONGER, only six of the thirty-one states with shale gas reserves
have thus far submitted their fracking regulations for review. 3" According-
ly, after nearly two decades of the modem fracking era, there is little sup-
port for the proposition that interstate learning has led or will lead to the
fracking policy diffusion.
Second, economic competition is unlikely to promote the spread of
fracking policy innovations. Economic competition in this context refers to
the proposition that governments look to the possible effects of adoption, or
lack of adoption, when compared to neighboring governments." 7 Naturally,
state governments tend to shy away from policies that will negatively im-
pact the state's economy and to embrace ones that will create a positive
impact.3"8 Given the potentially extraordinary local economic benefits, the
economics of fracking do not lend themselves to the spread of more strin-
gent regulation; rather, economic competition is more likely to produce
lower standards. As noted earlier, however, there does not appear to be any
evidence of fracking inducing a "race to the bottom."3 9 Nor, however, does
there appear to be a "race to the top."3 ' Rather, it appears most likely that
internal determinants play the predominant role in fracking policymaking.3 '
Similarly, there is no evidence of "imitation" in this area, nor does it
seem particularly likely. Imitation occurs when a government merely copies
the policy of another without regard for the consequences." 2 Whereas learn-
ing will focus on the action-the adoption of the new policy-imitation
RESOURCES 7 (2009), available at http://energyindepth.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/oil-
and-gas-regulation-report-final-with-cover-5-27-20091.pdf ("State oil and gas regulations are
adequately designed to directly protect water resources through the application of specific
programmatic elements such as permitting, well construction, well plugging, and temporary
abandonment requirements.").
306. See State Review of Oil & Natural Gas Envtl. Regulations, Past Reviews,
STRONGERINC.ORG, http://www.strongerinc.org/past-reviews (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
307. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956); Frederick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Disentangling Diffusion: The
Effects of Social Learning and Economic Competition on State Policy Innovation and Expan-
sion, 57 POL. RESOL. Q. 39, 39 (2004) ("[E]conomic competition may explain policy diffu-
sion as a response to inter-state pressures in the form of lost business, tax revenues and
jobs.").
308. See Shipan & Volden, supra note 297, at 851.
309. See Spence, supra note 17, at 493-97.
310. See, e.g., Boehmke & Witmer, supra note 307, at 40 ("[C]ompetition over poli-
cies that provide financial resources ... may provide an incentive to increase the extent of
the policy as neighboring states compete over business and tax revenue .. . ." (citing Frances
Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event
History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SC. REV. 395 (1990); Frances Stokes Berry & William D.
Berry, Tax Innovation in the States: Capitalizing on Political Opportunity, 36 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 715, 717 (1992); William R. Eadington, The Economics of Casino Gambling, J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 1999, at 173, 174).
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focuses on the identity of the earlier adopting government. States viewed as
leaders have consistently been found more likely to be imitated, since
smaller governments will attempt to raise their profile by also appearing to
be innovative.313 Yet, with fracking, states are not following usual environ-
mental "leaders," such as California, which has passed a law requiring the
state's natural resources agency to study potential impacts on drinking water
and to develop comprehensive permitting regulations by 2015 but which
will allow fracking to proceed as is for the time being,314 or New York,
which has imposed a statewide moratorium on the practice pending its own
study. Nor are states following "leaders" on the other side of regulatory
spectrum, such as North Dakota, an early adopter of a highly permissive
approach to fracking regulation.315
Thus, neither learning, economic competition, nor imitation appears to
have been particularly influential in the spread of fracking policy innova-
tion, nor do they appear likely to become so. Rather, internal determi-
nants-including local economic benefits and intrastate politics-appear to
be far more important. In such a situation, coercion, either through a cen-
tralized regulatory regime under federal law or through a mandated inter-
state collaborative, would likely produce a far greater amount of resource
pooling, technical and regulatory information sharing, and knowledge gen-
eration than the current decentralized approach.3"6 The goal of such a col-
laborative could be to allow for the sharing of information for its own sake,
to better inform state decision makers; alternatively, the goal could be to
create convergence, a uniform set of standards states must implement.3"7
There are a number of models available for such an interstate collabo-
rative. States could band together under the auspices of a nationwide com-
313. Id. at 843.
314. S.B. 4, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
315. See Hannah Wittmeyer, North Dakota Fracking Regulations, FRACKWIRE (July
20, 2013), http://frackwire.com/north-dakota-fracking-regulations/.
316. One can expect that there will be opposition to the prospect of a mandatory
collaborative, rather than an informal, network. Indeed, there are many examples of success-
ful informal networks. For instance, the Interstate Alliance on Stem Cell Research (IASCR)
is a voluntary organization that seeks to advance stem cell research by forging interstate
collaborations and assisting states in developing research programs. This organization has
helped pave the way for funding agreements, regulatory harmonization, and federal and state
policy development. See Geoffrey P. Lomax et al., Policy Harmonization Through Collabo-
ration: The Interstate Alliance on Stem Cell Research, in GENETICS POL'Y INST., 2010
WORLD STEM CELL REPORT (2010), available at http://nas-
sites.org/iascr/files/2013/01/LomaxIASCR_2010_publication.pdf However, the informal
nature of the IASCR works because the participants are trying to solve a common problem to
mutually benefit affiliated institutions and the interests they represent. The situation with
fracking is very different.
317. See Fglister, supra note 302, at 318 ("[T]he outcomes of diffusion can be mani-
fold: convergence is just one possible result of a diffusion process.").
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pact." 8 Alternatively, they could form a number of regional compacts or
commissions, which may be better situated to tailor uniform standards to the
local environmental and geological conditions." 9 However, unlike situations
in which national and regional compacts have proven successful, states ap-
parently do not perceive fracking to be a common problem that needs to be
addressed by multiple actors in a coordinated way to ensure success. Rather,
states appear to perceive fracking as an opportunity for intrastate economic
development, and the focus on risks is largely on the local impacts to specif-
ic places.
Thus, some other institutionalized form of intergovernmental coopera-
tion likely offers the best opportunity for fracking policy diffusion.32 ° States
have committed to such networks before in order to address environmental
risks, perhaps most prominently in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
("RGGI"). RGGI, established in the absence of federal action on climate
change, created a market for greenhouse gas emissions trading that demands
uniformity among the states to ensure the integrity of the market."' In a
slightly less ambitious vein, but perhaps more immediately analogous to
fracking, states have formed a collaborative that sets appliance energy effi-
ciency standards in areas where the federal government has not.322
Yet, a federal intervention remains the best answer, even if the federal
intervention is to require that the states form a network to share relevant
information or set appropriate uniform standards. In the two instances men-
tioned just above, the need for interstate collaboration was paramount-the
northeastern states that are members of RGGI could not have had a signifi-
318. Thad L. Beyle, New Directions in Interstate Relations, 416 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 108, 112 (1974).
319. For example, several states have recently formed a compact to try to solve nu-
merous problems associated with development of the health insurance exchanges required
under the Affordable Care Act. See NEW ENGLAND STATES COLLABORATIVE INS. EXCHANGE
Sys., http://www.nescies.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2014); see also Frank J. Thompson &
Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Implications
for Policy and Democratic Process, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 971, 985 (2007) (finding
evidence of state policy diffusion in the ninefold proliferation of major managed care initia-
tives during the 1990s).
320. Ftkglister, supra note 302 (showing that membership of policy makers in health
policy-specific intergovernmental bodies promotes the spread of best practices in health
insurance subsidy policies in Switzerland); see also Wiseman, supra note 299; Note, To
Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 842 (1989).
321. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2014); see also Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United
States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 65-66 (2005); Eleanor Stein, Re-
gional Initiatives to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, in AM. BAR ASS'N, GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 315,316-17 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).
322. See Klass, supra note 39, at 359-61 (discussing the Multi-State Appliance
Standards Collaborative).
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cant political or environmental impact acting alone, and doing so would put
them at an immediate economic disadvantage. Similarly, a single state's
requiring energy efficiency standards for appliances not otherwise covered
would have negligible effects on energy consumption, while potentially
costing residents money. Since the drinking water, hazardous waste, and
toxic release impacts of fracking are perceived to be primarily local-
though, as discussed above, these local impacts do implicate federal inter-
ests-there is likely less of a perceived need to collaborate. Accordingly,
the federal government most likely needs to step in to ensure that states are
adequately protecting those interests.
CONCLUSION
This Article has operated from the presumption that however big the
fracking boom already is, and however big it eventually turns out to be, it
should not come at the expense of public health and the environment. Such
a trade-off is, as a practical matter, unnecessary, is theoretically unsound,
and is inconsistent with our nation's environmental laws. Thus, this Article
has argued that the theoretical factors involved in federalism-choice analysis
indicate that fracking should be regulated under the existing cooperative
federalism regimes of SDWA and RCRA and the more unilateral regime of
EPCRA. It has also argued that federal regulation is fully consistent with the
original language, structure, and purposes of those statutes, as evidenced by
the statutes themselves and their legislative and regulatory histories. The
federal government is undertaking a number of efforts to increase regulation
of fracking, but these critical areas of drinking water, hazardous waste, and
toxic release information disclosure remain largely unregulated under feder-
al law. In the absence of direct federal regulation, a second-best solution
may still be available to ensure that policy innovations diffuse among the
states. This solution can be in the form of an interstate collaborative to share
information or establish uniform standards; however, given the economics
and politics of fracking today, the federal government will almost certainly
have to be the impetus for the creation of any such network.
1545
